西方的貨幣劃分

西方的貨幣劃分

米塞斯日報：星期二，2010年10月5日由美利北羅斯巴德

[摘自政府做了什麼有到我們的錢？一個 MP3音頻文件的這篇文章，閱讀傑夫 Riggenbach，可供下載。]

為了了解目前的貨幣混亂，有必要簡要地跟踪國際貨幣發展的20世紀，以了解每套不健全inflationist干預已經崩潰，其自身固有的問題，只設置了舞台，另一輪的干預措施。 20世紀歷史的世界貨幣秩序可以分為九段。讓我們看看每一個轉向。
To understand the current monetary chaos, it is necessary to trace briefly the international monetary developments of the 20th century, and to see how each set of unsound inflationist interventions has collapsed of its own inherent problems, only to set the stage for another round of interventions. The 20th-century history of the world monetary order can be divided into nine phases. Let us examine each in turn.

第一階段：古典黃金標準，1815年至1914年

我們可以回顧一下後，“經典”黃金標準，西方世界19世紀和20世紀初，由於文字和隱喻的黃金時代。隨著例外，銀頭疼的問題，世界上的黃金標準，這意味著每個國家貨幣（美元，英鎊，法郎等），僅僅是一個名字為一個確定重量的黃金。 “美元”，例如，被定義為 1 / 20盎司黃金，英鎊作為略小於 1 / 4盎司黃金，等等。這意味著，“匯率”之間的各種國家貨幣是固定的，不是因為他們被強行控制了政府，但在同樣的方式，一磅重定義為等於十六盎司。

國際金本位意味著金錢利益中有一人在世界各地擴展。其中一個原因的成長與繁榮，美國一直是事實，我們享受一錢整個大面積的國家。我們有一個金或至少是一個單一的美元標準在整個國家，沒有遭受混沌各縣市發行自己的貨幣，然後將波動相對於所有款項及其他城市縣。 19世紀看到的好處之一錢整個文明世界。一位資金促進自由貿易，投資，旅遊和貨幣各地，交易領域，隨之而來的增長，專業化和國際分工。

必須強調的是，黃金是各國政府不能任意選擇是貨幣的標準。黃金已經制定了許多世紀以來在自由市場上是最好的錢作為商品提供最穩定和理想的貨幣媒介。首先，供應和提供黃金只受市場力量，而不是任意印刷機的政府。

國際黃金市場的標準提供了一個自動檢查機制，對通脹的潛在的政府。它還提供了一個自動機制，保持國際收支的每個國家的平衡。正如哲學家和經濟學家大衛休謨指出，在18世紀中葉，如果一個國家，例如法國，其供應膨脹紙法郎，其價格上漲;增加收入的文件法郎刺激從國外進口，這也刺激了事實上，現在的進口價格相對便宜的價格比在家裡。

同時，較高的價格在國內抑制出口國外，其結果是赤字，國際收支，必須支付外國法郎兌現金。黃金外流意味著法國必須最終合同的膨脹紙法郎，以防止丟失其所有黃金。如果通貨膨脹所採取的形式有銀行存款，那麼，法國銀行貸款合同和存款，以避免破產的外國人呼籲法國的銀行存款兌換黃金。降低價格的收縮在家裡，並生成出口盈餘，從而扭轉了黃金外流，直到均衡價格水平在法國和其他國家。

誠然，政府干預到19世紀以前的速度減弱這一市場機制，允許商業週期的通貨膨脹和經濟衰退在這個黃金標準框架。這些干預措施尤其是：在政府的壟斷的薄荷，法定貨幣的法律，創造紙幣，通貨膨脹的發展和推動各銀行的政府。不過，雖然這些措施減緩了市場的調整，這些調整仍然在最終控制了局勢。因此，儘管古典金本位19世紀是不完美的，並允許較輕微的繁榮和蕭條，但它仍然為我們提供了迄今為止最好的貨幣秩序的世界已經知道的，一個秩序工作，從而保持經濟週期從失控的手，這使發展的國際自由貿易，交流和投資。[1]
We can look back upon the "classical" gold standard, the Western world of the 19th and early 20th centuries, as the literal and metaphorical Golden Age. With the exception of the troublesome problem of silver, the world was on a gold standard, which meant that each national currency (the dollar, pound, franc, etc.) was merely a name for a certain definite weight of gold. The "dollar," for example, was defined as 1/20 of a gold ounce, the pound sterling as slightly less than 1/4 of a gold ounce, and so on. This meant that the "exchange rates" between the various national currencies were fixed, not because they were arbitrarily controlled by government, but in the same way that one pound of weight is defined as being equal to sixteen ounces.

The international gold standard meant that the benefits of having one money medium were extended throughout the world. One of the reasons for the growth and prosperity of the United States has been the fact that we have enjoyed one money throughout the large area of the country. we have had a gold or at least a single dollar standard within the entire country, and did not have to suffer the chaos of each city and county issuing its own money, which would then fluctuate with respect to the moneys of all the other cities and counties. The 19th century saw the benefits of one money throughout the civilized world. One money facilitated freedom of trade, investment, and travel throughout that trading and monetary area, with the consequent growth of specialization and the international division of labor.

It must be emphasized that gold was not selected arbitrarily by governments to be the monetary standard. Gold had developed for many centuries on the free market as the best money; as the commodity providing the most stable and desirable monetary medium. Above all, the supply and provision of gold was subject only to market forces, and not to the arbitrary printing press of the government.

The international gold standard provided an automatic market mechanism for checking the inflationary potential of government. It also provided an automatic mechanism for keeping the balance of payments of each country in equilibrium. As the philosopher and economist David Hume pointed out in the mid-18th century, if one nation, say France, inflates its supply of paper francs, its prices rise; the increasing incomes in paper francs stimulate imports from abroad, which are also spurred by the fact that prices of imports are now relatively cheaper than prices at home.

At the same time, the higher prices at home discourage exports abroad; the result is a deficit in the balance of payments, which must be paid for by foreign countries cashing in francs for gold. The gold outflow means that France must eventually contract its inflated paper francs in order to prevent a loss of all of its gold. If the inflation has taken the form of bank deposits, then the French banks have to contract their loans and deposits in order to avoid bankruptcy as foreigners call upon the French banks to redeem their deposits in gold. The contraction lowers prices at home, and generates an export surplus, thereby reversing the gold outflow until the price levels are equalized in France and in other countries as well.

It is true that the interventions of governments previous to the 19th century weakened the speed of this market mechanism, and allowed for a business cycle of inflation and recession within this gold-standard framework. These interventions were particularly: the governments' monopolizing of the mint, legal tender laws, the creation of paper money, and the development of inflationary banking propelled by each of the governments. But while these interventions slowed the adjustments of the market, these adjustments were still in ultimate control of the situation. So while the classical gold standard of the 19th century was not perfect, and allowed for relatively minor booms and busts, it still provided us with by far the best monetary order the world has ever known, an order which worked, which kept business cycles from getting out of hand, and which enabled the development of free international trade, exchange, and investment.[1]

第二階段：第一次世界大戰後

如果古典金本位工作這麼好，為什麼它打破？它打破了，因為各國政府委託的任務，保持其貨幣應許，看到它的英鎊，美元，法郎等，總是贖回黃金，因為他們以及他們控制的銀行體系抵押。這不是黃金失敗，這是愚蠢的信任政府信守承諾。發動戰爭的災難性第一次世界大戰時，各國政府不得不抬高自身的供應紙和銀行的貨幣。因此，這是嚴重的通貨膨脹，這是不可能的交戰各國政府保持其承諾，所以他們就到“取消金本位制”，即宣布自己破產後不久，進入戰爭。美國以外的所有，而進入了戰爭後期，並沒有誇大美元的供應足以危害回贖。

但是，除了美國，世界上一些經濟學家現在遭受冰雹的涅槃可自由浮動匯率（現在被稱為“骯髒浮動”），競爭性貨幣貶值，交戰貨幣集團，外匯管制，關稅和配額，以及擊穿國際貿易和投資。膨脹英鎊，法郎，馬克等貶值有關黃金和美元，貨幣混亂世界各地比比皆是。

在那些日子裡有，令人高興的是，很少有經濟學家冰雹這種情況作為貨幣的理想選擇。人們普遍認識到，第二階段是國際災難的門檻，政客和經濟學家環顧四周，看如何恢復穩定和自由的古典黃金標準。
If the classical gold standard worked so well, why did it break down? It broke down because governments were entrusted with the task of keeping their monetary promises, of seeing to it that pounds, dollars, francs, etc., were always redeemable in gold as they and their controlled banking system had pledged. It was not gold that failed; it was the folly of trusting government to keep its promises. To wage the catastrophic war of World War I, each government had to inflate its own supply of paper and bank currency. So severe was this inflation that it was impossible for the warring governments to keep their pledges, and so they went "off the gold standard," i.e., declared their own bankruptcy, shortly after entering the war. All except the United States, which entered the war late, and did not inflate the supply of dollars enough to endanger redeemability.

But, apart from the United States, the world suffered what some economists now hail as the Nirvana of freely-fluctuating exchange rates (now called "dirty floats"), competitive devaluations, warring currency blocs, exchange controls, tariffs and quotas, and the breakdown of international trade and investment. The inflated pounds, francs, marks, etc., depreciated in relation to gold and the dollar; monetary chaos abounded throughout the world.

In those days there were, happily, very few economists to hail this situation as the monetary ideal. It was generally recognized that phase II was the threshold to international disaster, and politicians and economists looked around for ways to restore the stability and freedom of the classical gold standard.

第三階段：黃金交易所標準（英國和美國），1926年至1931年

如何返回到黃金時代？明智的做法將被承認的事實，現實的，事實上的貶值英鎊，法郎，馬克等，並返回到金本位制在重新定義速度：速度，承認現有的供應貨幣和價格水平。英鎊，例如，歷來被定義在一個權重，使得等於 4.86美元。但是到了第一次世界大戰結束，英國的通脹已使英鎊下跌至約 3.50美元的自由外匯市場。其他貨幣亦同樣貶值。明智的政策將已返回英國黃金約為 3.50美元，並為其他國家也這樣做誇大相同。第一階段已經順利並能迅速恢復。相反，英國作出的重大決定重返舊黃金面值的4.86美元。[2]

他們這樣做的原因，英國國民“威望”，並在倫敦，妄圖重新建立的“硬錢”金融中心的世界。為了成功在這片英雄的愚蠢，英國將不得不緊縮貨幣供應量嚴重，其價格水平，為在4.86美元鎊出口價格太高，沒有競爭力的世界市場。但通貨緊縮是現在在政治上出了問題，為發展工會，由全國支撐系統，失業保險，工資率作出了嚴格的向下;為了緊縮，英國政府將不得不扭轉其增長福利國家。事實上，英國希望繼續膨脹貨幣和價格。因此相結合的通脹帶有返回到高估桿，英國的出口都受到抑制，在20世紀 20年代，失業是嚴重的時期都在世界上大多數正在經歷一個經濟繁榮。

英國嘗試怎麼能有他們的蛋糕，吃它在同一時間？通過建立新的國際金融秩序會誘使或脅迫或其他政府將膨脹到要回被高估黃金標準桿為自己的貨幣，從而削弱自己的出口和進口補貼從英國。這正是英國一樣，因為它在前面帶路，在熱那亞會議 1922年，在創造一個新的國際金融秩序，金匯兌本位制。

在金匯兌本位制的工作情況如下：美國仍對古典金本位制，美元兌換黃金。英國和其他西方國家，但是，回到一個偽金本位制，1926年英國和其他國家在同一時間。英鎊和其他貨幣都沒有繳納的金幣，但只有在大型酒吧，只適合國際交易。這防止了普通公民的英國和其他歐洲國家使用金在生活上，從而允許更廣泛的程度和銀行的紙通貨膨脹。但此外，英國不僅在英鎊兌換黃金，而且在美元，而其他國家的貨幣不兌換黃金，但在磅。而最引起這些國家返回英國黃金高估平價。其結果是聚合了美國對黃金，英鎊對美元和其他歐洲貨幣對英鎊 - 在“金匯兌本位制”，與美元和英鎊的兩個“關鍵貨幣”。

現在，當英國膨脹，它經歷了赤字平衡國際收支，黃金標準的機制，沒有工作，迅速限制英國通脹。其他國家，而不是他們的英鎊兌換黃金，他們保持了英鎊和膨脹他們之上。因此，英國和歐洲獲准膨脹下去，和英國的赤字可以積累奔放的市場紀律的黃金標準。至於美國，英國能夠誘導美國抬高美元，以便不失去很多美元儲備或黃金來美國。

該點的金匯兌本位制是能不能持久;，誰最終必須支付，但只造成了災難性的反應，長時間通貨膨脹的繁榮。由於英鎊結餘堆積在法國，美國和其他地方，絲毫喪失信心日益動搖和傑里建通脹結構必然導致全面崩潰。這正是發生在1931年虛增銀行的失敗在整個歐洲，並嘗試“硬錢”法國英鎊的現金餘額在其黃金，導致英國去完全取消金本位制。不久之後，英國在歐洲其他國家。

How to return to the Golden Age? The sensible thing to do would have been to recognize the facts of reality, the fact of the depreciated pound, franc, mark, etc., and to return to the gold standard at a redefined rate: a rate that would recognize the existing supply of money and price levels. The British pound, for example, had been traditionally defined at a weight which made it equal to $4.86. But by the end of World War I, the inflation in Britain had brought the pound down to approximately $3.50 on the free foreign-exchange market. Other currencies were similarly depreciated. The sensible policy would have been for Britain to return to gold at approximately $3.50, and for the other inflated countries to do the same. Phase I could have been smoothly and rapidly restored. Instead, the British made the fateful decision to return to gold at the old par of $4.86.[2]

They did so for reasons of British national "prestige," and in a vain attempt to reestablish London as the "hard money" financial center of the world. To succeed at this piece of heroic folly, Britain would have had to deflate severely its money supply and its price levels, for at a $4.86 pound British export prices were far too high to be competitive in the world markets. But deflation was now politically out of the question, for the growth of trade unions, buttressed by a nationwide system of unemployment insurance, had made wage rates rigid downward; in order to deflate, the British government would have had to reverse the growth of its welfare state. In fact, the British wished to continue to inflate money and prices. As a result of combining inflation with a return to an overvalued par, British exports were depressed all during the 1920s and unemployment was severe all during the period when most of the world was experiencing an economic boom.

How could the British try to have their cake and eat it at the same time? By establishing a new international monetary order which would induce or coerce other governments into inflating or into going back to gold at overvalued pars for their own currencies, thus crippling their own exports and subsidizing imports from Britain. This is precisely what Britain did, as it led the way, at the Genoa Conference of 1922, in creating a new international monetary order, the gold-exchange standard.

The gold-exchange standard worked as follows: The United States remained on the classical gold standard, redeeming dollars in gold. Britain and the other countries of the West, however, returned to a pseudo-gold standard, Britain in 1926 and the other countries around the same time. British pounds and other currencies were not payable in gold coins, but only in large-sized bars, suitable only for international transactions. This prevented the ordinary citizens of Britain and other European countries from using gold in their daily life, and thus permitted a wider degree of paper and bank inflation. But furthermore, Britain redeemed pounds not merely in gold, but also in dollars; while the other countries redeemed their currencies not in gold, but in pounds. And most of these countries were induced by Britain to return to gold at overvalued parities. The result was a pyramiding of United States on gold, of British pounds on dollars, and of other European currencies on pounds — the "gold-exchange standard," with the dollar and the pound as the two "key currencies."

Now when Britain inflated, and experienced a deficit in its balance of payments, the gold-standard mechanism did not work to quickly restrict British inflation. For instead of other countries redeeming their pounds for gold, they kept the pounds and inflated on top of them. Hence Britain and Europe were permitted to inflate unchecked, and British deficits could pile up unrestrained by the market discipline of the gold standard. As for the United States, Britain was able to induce the United States to inflate dollars so as not to lose many dollar reserves or gold to the United States.

The point of the gold-exchange standard is that it cannot last; the piper must eventually be paid, but only in a disastrous reaction to the lengthy inflationary boom. As sterling balances piled up in France, the United States, and elsewhere, the slightest loss of confidence in the increasingly shaky and jerry-built inflationary structure was bound to lead to general collapse. This is precisely what happened in 1931; the failure of inflated banks throughout Europe, and the attempt of "hard money" France to cash in its sterling balances for gold, led Britain to go off the gold standard completely. Britain was soon followed by the other countries of Europe.

第四階段：法定貨幣波動，1931-1945

世界是現在又回到了貨幣混亂的第一次世界大戰，但現在似乎有一點希望有一個恢復的黃金。國際經濟秩序的混亂已經分裂為清潔和骯髒的浮動匯率，競爭性貨幣貶值，外匯管制和貿易障礙，國際經濟和貨幣之間的貨幣戰爭肆虐和貨幣集團。國際貿易和投資都幾乎癱瘓，貿易通過易貨貿易協定進行了由政府進行競爭，彼此衝突。國務卿赫爾多次指出，這些貨幣和經濟衝突的主要原因是20世紀 30年代第二次世界大戰 [3]。

美國仍對黃金標準兩年，然後在1933年至1934年，去了經典的黃金標準，妄圖擺脫了大蕭條。美國公民可以不再兌換美元的黃金，甚至禁止其擁有任何黃金，無論是在國內還是國外。但美國依然存在，1934年後，在一個特殊的新形式的黃金標準，在美元，現在重新定義為 1 / 35盎司的黃金，是可贖回的黃金向外國政府和中央銀行。一個揮之不去的領帶金價依然。此外，歐洲貨幣混亂，導致黃金流入的唯一相對安全的避風港貨幣，美國。

肆無忌憚的混亂和經濟戰的1930點了一個重要的教訓：在嚴重的政治缺陷（除了經濟問題）在米爾頓弗里德曼的芝加哥學派的貨幣計劃可自由波動的法定貨幣。對於會做什麼 Friedmanites - 在自由市場的名稱 - 是切斷所有的聯繫，黃金完全離開每個國家的絕對控制貨幣在中央政府手中發出的文件，作為法定貨幣的菲亞特 - 然後告知各政府允許其貨幣自由浮動的所有其他方面的法定貨幣，以及避免過於誇大其貨幣悍然。嚴重的政治缺陷是手總量控制貨幣供給的民族國家，並希望和期待，國家將不使用這種權力。而且，由於力量總是趨向於使用，包括假冒的權力在法律上，天真，以及中央集權的性質，這種類型的程序應該是赤裸裸的明顯。

因此，災難性的經驗，第四階段，20世紀 30年代世界菲亞特紙和經濟戰，導致美國當局採取的經濟戰爭作為其主要目的是第二次世界大戰的一個可行的恢復國際貨幣秩序，一個訂單就可能建立一個文藝復興時期的世界貿易和成果的國際分工。
The world was now back to the monetary chaos of World War I, except that now there seemed to be little hope for a restoration of gold. The international economic order had disintegrated into the chaos of clean and dirty floating exchange rates, competing devaluations, exchange controls, and trade barriers; international economic and monetary warfare raged between currencies and currency blocs. International trade and investment came to a virtual standstill; and trade was conducted through barter agreements conducted by governments competing and conflicting with one another. Secretary of State Cordell Hull repeatedly pointed out that these monetary and economic conflicts of the 1930s were the major cause of World War II.[3]

The United States remained on the gold standard for two years, and then, in 1933–1934, went off the classical gold standard in a vain attempt to get out of the depression. American citizens could no longer redeem dollars in gold, and were even prohibited from owning any gold, either here or abroad. But the United States remained, after 1934, on a peculiar new form of gold standard, in which the dollar, now redefined to 1/35 of a gold ounce, was redeemable in gold to foreign governments and central banks. A lingering tie to gold remained. Furthermore, the monetary chaos in Europe led to gold flowing into the only relatively safe monetary haven, the United States.

The chaos and the unbridled economic warfare of the 1930s points up an important lesson: the grievous political flaw (apart from the economic problems) in the Milton Friedman-Chicago School monetary scheme for freely-fluctuating fiat currencies. For what the Friedmanites would do — in the name of the free market — is to cut all ties to gold completely, leave the absolute control of each national currency in the hands of its central government issuing fiat paper as legal tender — and then advise each government to allow its currency to fluctuate freely with respect to all other fiat currencies, as well as to refrain from inflating its currency too outrageously. The grave political flaw is to hand total control of the money supply to the Nation-State, and then to hope and expect that the State will refrain from using that power. And since power always tends to be used, including the power to counterfeit legally, the naivete, as well as the statist nature, of this type of program should be starkly evident.

And so, the disastrous experience of phase IV, the 1930s world of fiat paper and economic warfare, led the US authorities to adopt as their major economic war aim of World War II the restoration of a viable international monetary order, an order on which could be built a renaissance of world trade and the fruits of the international division of labor.

第五階段：布雷頓森林和新金匯兌本位（美國）1945年至68年

新的國際貨幣秩序的設想，然後通過推動美國在國際貨幣會議在布雷頓森林，新罕布什爾州，中旬1944年，經國會批准在七月，1945年。儘管布雷頓森林體系的工作遠勝於上世紀 30年代的災難，它的工作只是作為另一個通貨膨脹復發的金匯兌本位制的1920 - 像1920 - 系統只活在借來的時間。

新的系統基本上是金匯兌本位制，但與上世紀 20年代美元取代英鎊粗暴地為一體的“主要貨幣”。現在美元，價值 1 / 35盎司的黃金，也成為唯一的關鍵貨幣。另一個不同是，從 20世紀 20年代，美元不再兌換黃金的美國公民，而是1930年的系統仍在繼續，美元兌換黃金只向外國政府和中央銀行。沒有個人，只有政府，是被允許的特權救贖美元，在世界黃金貨幣。

在布雷頓森林體系，美國金字塔美元（對紙幣和銀行存款）黃金之上，其中美元可以兌換外國政府，而所有其他國家政府舉行的美元作為基本的貨幣儲備，對金字塔頂部美元。此外，由於美國開始了戰後世界的一個巨大的存量黃金（約 250億美元）有足夠的美元債權玩金字塔之上的。此外，該系統可以“工作”了一段時間，因為世界上所有的貨幣返回前的新系統在二戰標準桿，其中大部分是在條件非常高估的膨脹和貨幣貶值。英鎊的膨脹，例如，返回在4.86美元，儘管它是價值遠遠小於條款，在市場上的購買力。因為，美元被人為低估和大多數其他貨幣在1945年被高估，美元被製成稀少，世界遭受了所謂的美元短缺，而美國的納稅人應該是有義務，靠外國援助。總之，出口順差享有被低估的美元將部分資金是由美國納稅人倒霉的形式外援。

“自1971年以來，市場黃金價格從來沒有低於舊的固定價格 35美元一盎司。”

有足夠的空間被通脹報復前可以規定，在美國政府開始其戰後持續的貨幣政策，通貨膨脹，它一直奉行的政策歡快至今。到了50年代初，美國通脹開始持續力挽狂瀾的國際貿易。因為儘管美國膨脹，貨幣和信貸擴張，主要歐洲國家的政府，其中許多是受“奧”的貨幣顧問，追求一個相對“硬錢”政策（例如，西德，瑞士，法國，意大利）。英國被迫急inflationist其流出的美元，英鎊貶值更符合實際的水平（這一段約 2.40美元）。

所有這一切，再加上提高生產力的歐洲，後來日本，導致持續平衡國際收支赤字和美國。隨著 20世紀 50年代和60年代的推移，美國越來越 inflationist，無論是絕對和相對日本和西歐。但是，古典金本位檢查通貨膨脹 - 尤其是美國通脹 - 不見了。對於規則的布雷頓森林比賽規定，西歐各國不得不繼續堆放其儲備，甚至使用這些美元為基地，誇大自己的貨幣和信貸。

但隨著 20世紀 50年代和60年代的持續，更難貨幣西歐國家（和日本）成為不安於被迫堆放美元被高估，而不是現在越來越被低估。隨著購買力的真正價值，因此美元下跌，他們越來越不想要的外國政府。但是，他們被鎖入一個系統，被越來越多的夢魘。美國的反應，歐洲的投訴，由法國和DeGaulle為首的主要貨幣顧問，古典金本位經濟學家的JcaquesRueff，只是蔑視和粗暴解僱。美國的政治家和經濟學家簡單地宣布，歐洲不得不使用美元作為其正式貨幣，它也沒有辦法對它越來越多的問題，因此美國可能會繼續膨脹，而輕率地推行政策的“善意忽視”向國際貨幣後果其自己的行動。

但歐洲確實有法律選擇的黃金兌換美元，35美元一盎司。而由於美元日益被高估的貨幣條件艱苦的錢和黃金，歐洲各國政府也開始越來越多地行使這一選擇。黃金標準的檢查是未來投入使用，因此黃金流入穩步走出了美國 20年後，50年代初，美國的黃金儲備，直至萎縮在此期間，從超過 200億美元至90億美元。由於美元不斷膨脹金基萎縮後，如何能保持美國外交美元兌換黃金 - 的基石，布雷頓森林體系？

這些問題並沒有放慢美國繼續通貨膨脹美元和價格，也不是美國的政策的“善意的忽視”，這導致了60年代後期在加速堆積不低於 800億美元不必要的美元在歐洲（被稱為歐洲美元）。試圖阻止歐洲贖回美元黃金，美國施加巨大的政治壓力對歐洲各國政府，類似的，但在規模大得多的英國，法國不哄騙其沉重英鎊兌換結餘，直到1931年。但是，經濟規律有一個方法，終於，赶超與各國政府，這是發生在通脹高興美國政府在20世紀 60年代末。黃金交換系統布雷頓森林體系 - 歡呼美國的政治和經濟的建立作為常任理事國和堅不可摧 - 開始於 1968年迅速瓦解。

The new international monetary order was conceived and then driven through by the United States at an international monetary conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in mid-1944, and ratified by the Congress in July, 1945. While the Bretton Woods system worked far better than the disaster of the 1930s, it worked only as another inflationary recrudescence of the gold-exchange standard of the 1920s and — like the 1920s — the system lived only on borrowed time.

The new system was essentially the gold-exchange standard of the 1920s but with the dollar rudely displacing the British pound as one of the "key currencies." Now the dollar, valued at 1/35 of a gold ounce, was to be the only key currency. The other difference from the 1920s was that the dollar was no longer redeemable in gold to American citizens; instead, the 1930's system was continued, with the dollar redeemable in gold only to foreign governments and their central banks. No private individuals, only governments, were to be allowed the privilege of redeeming dollars in the world gold currency.

In the Bretton Woods system, the United States pyramided dollars (in paper money and in bank deposits) on top of gold, in which dollars could be redeemed by foreign governments; while all other governments held dollars as their basic reserve and pyramided their currency on top of dollars. And since the United States began the postwar world with a huge stock of gold (approximately $25 billion) there was plenty of play for pyramiding dollar claims on top of it. Furthermore, the system could "work" for a while because all the world's currencies returned to the new system at their pre-World War II pars, most of which were highly overvalued in terms of their inflated and depreciated currencies. The inflated pound sterling, for example, returned at $4.86, even though it was worth far less than that in terms of purchasing power on the market. Since the dollar was artificially undervalued and most other currencies overvalued in 1945, the dollar was made scarce, and the world suffered from a so-called dollar shortage, which the American taxpayer was supposed to be obligated to make up by foreign aid. In short, the export surplus enjoyed by the undervalued American dollar was to be partly financed by the hapless American taxpayer in the form of foreign aid.
"Since 1971, the market price of gold has never been below the old fixed price of $35 an ounce."

There being plenty of room for inflation before retribution could set in, the US government embarked on its postwar policy of continual monetary inflation, a policy it has pursued merrily ever since. By the early 1950s, the continuing American inflation began to turn the tide of international trade. For while the United States was inflating and expanding money and credit, the major European governments, many of them influenced by "Austrian" monetary advisers, pursued a relatively "hard money" policy (e.g., West Germany, Switzerland, France, Italy). Steeply inflationist Britain was compelled by its outflow of dollars to devalue the pound to more realistic levels (for a while it was approximately $2.40).

All this, combined with the increasing productivity of Europe, and later Japan, led to continuing balance-of-payments deficits with the United States. As the 1950s and 1960s wore on, the United States became more and more inflationist, both absolutely and relatively to Japan and Western Europe. But the classical gold-standard check on inflation — especially American inflation — was gone. For the rules of the Bretton Woods game provided that the West European countries had to keep piling up their reserve, and even use these dollars as a base to inflate their own currency and credit.

But as the 1950s and 1960s continued, the harder-money countries of West Europe (and Japan) became restless at being forced to pile up dollars that were now increasingly overvalued instead of undervalued. As the purchasing power and hence the true value of dollars fell, they became increasingly unwanted by foreign governments. But they were locked into a system that was more and more of a nightmare. The American reaction to the European complaints, headed by France and DeGaulle's major monetary adviser, the classical gold-standard economist Jacques Rueff, was merely scorn and brusque dismissal. American politicians and economists simply declared that Europe was forced to use the dollar as its currency, that it could do nothing about its growing problems, and therefore the United States could keep blithely inflating while pursuing a policy of "benign neglect" toward the international monetary consequences of its own actions.

But Europe did have the legal option of redeeming dollars in gold at $35 an ounce. And as the dollar became increasingly overvalued in terms of hard money currencies and gold, European governments began more and more to exercise that option. The gold-standard check was coming into use; hence gold flowed steadily out of the United States for two decades after the early 1950s, until the US gold stock dwindled over this period from over $20 billion to $9 billion. As dollars kept inflating upon a dwindling gold base, how could the United States keep redeeming foreign dollars in gold — the cornerstone of the Bretton Woods system?

These problems did not slow down continued US inflation of dollars and prices, nor the United States policy of "benign neglect," which resulted by the late 1960s in an accelerated pileup of no less than $80 billion in unwanted dollars in Europe (known as Eurodollars). To try to stop European redemption of dollars into gold, the United States exerted intense political pressure on the European governments, similar but on a far larger scale to the British cajoling of France not to redeem its heavy sterling balances until 1931. But economic law has a way, at long last, of catching up with governments, and this is what happened to the inflation-happy US government by the end of the 1960s. The gold-exchange system of Bretton Woods — hailed by the US political and economic establishment as permanent and impregnable — began to unravel rapidly in 1968.

第六階段：布雷頓森林體系的揭開，1968-1971

由於美元與黃金堆積在國外繼續向外流動，美國發現越來越難以維持黃金價格在35美元一盎司黃金的自由市場在倫敦和蘇黎世。 35美元一盎司是梯形的制度，而美國公民被禁止從 1934年以來黃金擁有在世界任何地方，其他公民享有的自由，自己的金條和金幣。因此，單程個別歐洲人手中的美元兌換黃金是出售他們的美元對黃金的35美元一盎司黃金的自由市場。由於不斷膨脹，美元貶值，作為美國平衡國際收支赤字持續，歐洲人和其他私人市民開始加速其銷售黃金的美元。為了保持對美元在35美元一盎司，美國政府被迫洩漏減少黃金股票從 35美元的價格支持在倫敦和蘇黎世。

一個信任危機，美元對黃金市場主導的自由美國的影響從根本上改變貨幣體系 1968年3月。這個想法是為了阻止討厭的自由黃金市場從曾經再次危及布雷頓森林安排。因此誕生了“雙層黃金市場。”當時的想法是自由的黃金市場可以去大火，那將是嚴格絕緣的實際行動，貨幣的中央銀行和政府的世界。美國將不再試圖保持自由市場黃金價格為 35美元，那將無視自由的黃金市場，它和所有其他政府同意保持美元的價值在35美元一盎司到永遠。
“兩層系統對危機迅速蔓延 - 並最終解散布雷頓森林體系”。

政府和中央銀行的世界將從此不再購買黃金，從“外”市場，將出售更多的黃金沒有對這一市場，從現在開始，黃金將只需將作為從一個櫃檯到另一個中央銀行，新的黃金供應免費黃金市場，黃金或私人需求，他們會帶自己的過程中完全脫離貨幣安排世界。

伴隨著這一點，美國極力推動新推出的一個新種世界紙張儲備，特別提款權（特別提款權），它是希望最終將完全取代黃金，並作為一個新的世界紙幣將發行未來的世界儲備銀行，如果這樣的制度是以往任何時候都成立的話，美國可能永遠膨脹選中，聯同其他世界各國政府（當時唯一的限制將是災難性的一個世界範圍內通貨膨脹失控和crackup世界紙貨幣）。但特別提款權，combatted激烈，因為他們已經是西歐和“硬錢”的國家，迄今只有一小補充，美國和其他貨幣儲備。

所有親紙經濟學家，從凱恩斯主義到Friedmanites，現在已經有信心就會消失，黃金在國際貨幣體系;切斷了它的“支持”，由美元，這些經濟學家都滿懷信心地預言，自由市場黃金價格會很快下降低於 35美元一盎司，甚至下降到估計的“工業”非貨幣性黃金價格 10美元一盎司。相反，自由的黃金價格，不會低於 35美元，已穩步美元以上的35人，由1973年初已攀升至約 125美元一盎司，這個數字是無親紙經濟學家會想到可能就在一年前。

遠從建立一個永久性的新的貨幣體系，兩層黃金市場只買了幾年的時間;美國的通貨膨脹和財政赤字的繼續。歐洲美元迅速積累，黃金繼續向外流動，具有較高的自由市場黃金價格只是揭示了世界的信心喪失加速了美元。兩層系統對危機迅速蔓延 - 並最終解散布雷頓森林體系 [4]。
As dollars piled up abroad and gold continued to flow outward, the United States found it increasingly difficult to maintain the price of gold at $35 an ounce in the free gold markets at London and Zurich. Thirty-five dollars an ounce was the keystone of the system, and while American citizens have been barred since 1934 from owning gold anywhere in the world, other citizens have enjoyed the freedom to own gold bullion and coin. Hence, one way for individual Europeans to redeem their dollars in gold was to sell their dollars for gold at $35 an ounce in the free gold market. As the dollar kept inflating and depreciating, and as American balance-of-payments deficits continued, Europeans and other private citizens began to accelerate their sales of dollars into gold. In order to keep the dollar at $35 an ounce, the US government was forced to leak out gold from its dwindling stock to support the $35 price at London and Zurich.

A crisis of confidence in the dollar on the free gold markets led the United States to effect a fundamental change in the monetary system in March 1968. The idea was to stop the pesky free gold market from ever again endangering the Bretton Woods arrangement. Hence was born the "two-tier gold market." The idea was that the free gold market could go to blazes; it would be strictly insulated from the real monetary action in the central banks and governments of the world. The United States would no longer try to keep the free-market gold price at $35; it would ignore the free gold market, and it and all the other governments agreed to keep the value of the dollar at $35 an ounce forevermore.
"The two-tier system moved rapidly toward crisis — and to the final dissolution of Bretton Woods."

The governments and central banks of the world would henceforth buy no more gold from the "outside" market and would sell no more gold to that market; from now on gold would simply move as counters from one central bank to another, and new gold supplies, free gold market, or private demand for gold would take their own course completely separated from the monetary arrangements of the world.

Along with this, the United States pushed hard for the new launching of a new kind of world paper reserve, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which it was hoped would eventually replace gold altogether and serve as a new world paper currency to be issued by a future World Reserve Bank; if such a system were ever established, then the United States could inflate unchecked forevermore, in collaboration with other world governments (the only limit would then be the disastrous one of a worldwide runaway inflation and the crackup of the world paper currency). But the SDRs, combatted intensely as they have been by Western Europe and the "hard-money" countries, have so far been only a small supplement to American and other currency reserves.

All pro-paper economists, from Keynesians to Friedmanites, were now confident that gold would disappear from the international monetary system; cut off from its "support" by the dollar, these economists all confidently predicted, the free-market gold price would soon fall below $35 an ounce, and even down to the estimated "industrial" nonmonetary gold price of $10 an ounce. Instead, the free price of gold, never below $35, had been steadily above $35, and by early 1973 had climbed to around $125 an ounce, a figure that no pro-paper economist would have thought possible as recently as a year earlier.

Far from establishing a permanent new monetary system, the two-tier gold market only bought a few years of time; American inflation and deficits continued. Eurodollars accumulated rapidly, gold continued to flow outward, and the higher free-market price of gold simply revealed the accelerated loss of world confidence in the dollar. The two-tier system moved rapidly toward crisis — and to the final dissolution of Bretton Woods.[4]

第七階段：最終的布雷頓森林體系：法定貨幣波動，八月至1971年12月

8月15日，1971年，在同一時間，美國總統尼克松的價格實行工資凍結，妄圖包圍檢查通貨膨脹，尼克松先生也帶來了戰後布雷頓森林體系崩潰到結束。隨著歐洲央行最後揚言要贖回他們的大部分股票腫美元的黃金，尼克松總統徹底關閉了黃金。這是第一次在美國歷史上，美元是完全菲亞特，完全沒有黃金的支持。即使是微妙的聯繫與黃金保持1933年以來，現在斷。世界正陷入上世紀 30年代菲亞特系統 - 更糟的是，因為現在即使是美元不再與黃金掛鉤。前方若隱若現的恐懼幽靈貨幣集團，競爭性貨幣貶值，經濟戰，擊穿國際貿易和投資，與世界範圍的經濟衰退有便會隨之而來。

怎麼辦？試圖恢復國際貨幣秩序缺乏一個鏈接到黃金，美國領導的世界帶入 12月18日史密森協定，1971年。
On August 15, 1971, at the same time that President Nixon imposed a price-wage freeze in a vain attempt to check bounding inflation, Mr. Nixon also brought the postwar Bretton Woods system to a crashing end. As European central banks at last threatened to redeem much of their swollen stock of dollars for gold, President Nixon went totally off gold. For the first time in American history, the dollar was totally fiat, totally without backing in gold. Even the tenuous link with gold maintained since 1933 was now severed. The world was plunged into the fiat system of the 1930s — and worse, since now even the dollar was no longer linked to gold. Ahead loomed the dread spectre of currency blocs, competing devaluations, economic warfare, and the breakdown of international trade and investment, with the worldwide depression that would then ensue.

What to do? Attempting to restore an international monetary order lacking a link to gold, the United States led the world into the Smithsonian Agreement on December 18, 1971.

第八階段：史密森協定，1971年12月，1973年2月

史密森協定，尼克松總統稱讚為“最偉大的金融協議，在歷史的世界”，更是不可靠和不健全的比金匯兌本位制或超過上世紀 20年代布雷頓森林體系。這一次再次，世界各國的承諾維持固定匯率，但這次沒有黃金或世界錢給任何貨幣的後盾。此外，許多歐洲貨幣被低估平價固定在相對於美元;美國唯一讓步是微不足道的貶值美元匯率的官方38美元一盎司。不過，雖然許多太少，太晚了，這種貶值是一個顯著無盡的全面侵犯美國官方的聲明，其中承諾要維持 35美元的速度永遠。現在，在去年35美元的價格是含蓄地承認為不雕刻的石粒。

這是不可避免的固定匯率，甚至更廣泛的一致區域波動，但缺少一個世界中的交流，注定要迅速失敗。這是特別真實的，因為美國通貨膨脹的貨幣和價格的下降，美元和平衡國際收支逆差繼續聽之任之。

腫脹的供應歐洲美元，再加上持續的通貨膨脹和拆卸的黃金作後盾，推動了自由市場的黃金價格高達 215美元一盎司。而作為高估和低估，美元對歐洲和日本的硬錢變得越來越明顯，終於解體，美元對世界市場的恐慌個月日至1973年3月。它不可能成為西德，瑞士，法國和其他國家繼續硬錢購買美元，以支持美元匯率的高估。在一年多一點，史密森尼系統中沒有黃金的固定匯率已粉碎的岩石上，除了經濟現實。
The Smithsonian Agreement, hailed by President Nixon as the "greatest monetary agreement in the history of the world," was even more shaky and unsound than the gold-exchange standard of the 1920s or than Bretton Woods. For once again, the countries of the world pledged to maintain fixed exchange rates, but this time with no gold or world money to give any currency backing. Furthermore, many European currencies were fixed at undervalued parities in relation to the dollar; the only US concession was a puny devaluation of the official dollar rate to $38 an ounce. But while much too little and too late, this devaluation was significant in violating an endless round of official American pronouncements, which had pledged to maintain the $35 rate forevermore. Now at last the $35 price was implicitly acknowledged as not graven on tablets of stone.

It was inevitable that fixed exchange rates, even with wider agreed zones of fluctuation, but lacking a world medium of exchange, were doomed to rapid defeat. This was especially true since American inflation of money and prices, the decline of the dollar, and balance-of-payments deficits continued unchecked.

The swollen supply of Eurodollars, combined with the continued inflation and the removal of gold backing, drove the free-market gold price up to $215 an ounce. And as the overvaluation of the dollar and the undervaluation of European and Japanese hard money became increasingly evident, the dollar finally broke apart on the world markets in the panic months of February–March 1973. It became impossible for West Germany, Switzerland, France and the other hard money countries to continue to buy dollars in order to support the dollar at an overvalued rate. In little over a year, the Smithsonian system of fixed exchange rates without gold had smashed apart on the rocks of economic reality.

第九階段：法定貨幣的波動，1973年3月 - ？

隨著美元分裂，世界再次轉移，在法定貨幣體系的波動。在西歐集團，匯率掛鉤彼此，美國再次貶值，美元匯率的官方象徵性金額由42美元一盎司。由於美元匯率暴跌，從一天又一天，和西方德國馬克，瑞士法郎，日元和飛進向上，美國當局，背靠弗里德曼經濟學家開始認為這是貨幣的理想選擇。誠然，美元的盈餘和突發平衡國際收支危機並不鼠疫在世界受到匯率波動。此外，美國出口企業開始得意的高笑是美元貶值使得美國商品更便宜的利率在國外，因此受惠的出口。誠然，政府堅持干預匯率波動（“臟”而不是“乾淨”浮筒），但總體看來，國際金融秩序有越軌到弗里德曼的烏托邦。

但很明顯所有的太快，一切都遠遠好於目前的國際貨幣體系。從長遠的問題是，硬貨幣的國家不會坐視永遠看著自己的貨幣變得更加昂貴，傷害他們的出口，以造福他們的美國競爭對手。如果美國的通貨膨脹和美元貶值下去，他們很快就會轉移到競爭性貶值，外匯管制，貨幣集團和經濟戰 20世紀 30年代。

但更直接的是，對方的硬幣：事實上，美元貶值意味著美國進口的更昂貴，美國遊客遭受國外，廉價出口搶購外國如此之快，以提高出口價格在家裡（例如，美國小麥和肉的價格通貨膨脹）。因此，美國的出口商可能確實的好處，但只能在犧牲通脹纏身的美國消費者。快速的削弱不確定性的匯率波動是赤裸裸地回家給美國人帶來的快速下跌，美元在外匯市場在1973年7月。

由於美國完全關閉了金1971年8月，成立了弗里德曼波動菲亞特系統 1973年3月，美國和整個世界都遭受了最激烈，最持久的和平時期通貨膨脹布特在歷史的世界。它現在應該清楚，這是幾乎沒有一個巧合。之前，美元兌開除的黃金，凱恩斯主義者和Friedmanites，各按他們自己的方式向菲亞特公司投入紙幣，自信地預言，成立時法定貨幣，市場黃金價格將下降迅速的非貨幣的水平，那麼估計約為8美元一盎司。

在他們蔑視的黃金，這兩個群體認為，這是強大的支撐美元的是黃金的價格，而不是相反。自1971年以來，市場黃金價格從來沒有低於舊的固定價格 35美元一盎司，幾乎總是比現在高出許多。時，在20世紀 50年代和60年代，經濟學家如被要求的JcaquesRueff金標準的價格每盎司70美元的價格被認為是荒謬的高度。它現在甚至荒謬地低。遠高的黃金價格是災難性惡化的跡象，美元因為“現代”經濟學家有自己的方式和所有黃金的支持已被刪除。

現在是很清楚，世界已變得厭倦了空前的通貨膨脹，在美國和世界各地，已經引起了時代的脈動法定貨幣於 1973年落成。我們也厭倦和不可預測的極端波動的貨幣匯率。這種波動的後果是菲亞特的國家貨幣制度，分散在世界的金錢和政治的不穩定添加人工的自然不確定性在自由市場的價格體系。弗里德曼夢想的法定貨幣波動在於灰燼，並且有一個可以理解的渴望回到一個國際貨幣固定匯率。

不幸的是，古典金本位謊言被遺忘，而最終目標，大多數美國和世界領導人是老凱恩斯主義視野中的一個世界菲亞特皮標，一個新的貨幣單位出具由世界儲備銀行（WRB）。無論是新的貨幣被稱之為“的Bancor”（提供的凱恩斯）中，“安盟”（擬由二戰美國財政部官員哈里德克斯特白），或“鳳凰”（建議由經濟學家）是不重要的。在重要的一點是，這樣一個國際紙幣，而確實免費的平衡國際收支危機（因為 WRB可以發出高達 bancors，因為它希望和供應到自己國家的選擇），將提供一個開放的通道無限世界性的通貨膨脹，或者未檢查的平衡國際收支危機或匯率下跌。

該 WRB然後將全能的行列式的世界貨幣供應和國家分配。該 WRB可以而且會受到世界它認為將是一個明智地控制通貨膨脹。不幸的是，然後將沒有站在方式無法想像的災難性的經濟大屠殺的世界性通貨膨脹失控，沒什麼，就是，除了可疑的容量WRB微調世界經濟。

雖然世界各地紙張單位和央行的最終目標仍然是世界的凱恩斯主義為導向的領導者，更現實和近因目標是返回到一個華而不實的布雷頓森林體系的計劃，但這次沒有檢查任何襯於黃金。已經是世界主要央行正試圖“協調”的貨幣和經濟政策，協調通貨膨脹率，匯率和修復。好戰的驅動歐洲發行紙幣由歐洲中央銀行似乎一觸即發的成功。這個目標是被賣給了輕信公眾的荒謬主張自由貿易歐洲經濟共同體（歐共體）必然需要一個總體的歐洲官僚主義，一個統一的稅收在整個歐共體，並在特別是，歐洲央行和紙單位。一旦實現，更密切的協調與聯邦儲備委員會和其他主要央行將立即跟進。然後，可以進入世界中央銀行還會遠嗎？短這一最終目標，但是，我們可能很快就會陷入另一個布雷頓森林體系，與隨之而來的危機，所有的國際收支和Gresham的法律，遵循固定匯率的世界菲亞特款項。

因此，面對未來，預後美元和國際貨幣體系確實是嚴峻的。除非我們回到古典金本位制在一個現實的黃金價格，國際貨幣體系是命中註定之間來回移動固定和浮動匯率構成，每個系統沒有解決的問題，工作得不好，終於瓦解。而且加速了這種分化將是持續的通貨膨脹的供應，因此美元的價格，顯示美國沒有減弱的跡象。對未來的前景正在加速，並最終在國內通貨膨脹失控，伴隨著貨幣崩潰和經濟戰國外。這預後只能改變了一個急劇改變了美國和世界貨幣體系：由回歸到自由市場的商品貨幣，如黃金，和消除政府完全從貨幣場景。
With the dollar breaking apart, the world shifted again, to a system of fluctuating fiat currencies. Within the West European bloc, exchange rates were tied to one another, and the United States again devalued the official dollar rate by a token amount to $42 an ounce. As the dollar plunged in foreign exchange from day to day, and the West German mark, the Swiss franc, and the Japanese yen hurtled upward, the American authorities, backed by the Friedmanite economists, began to think that this was the monetary ideal. It is true that dollar surpluses and sudden balance-of-payments crises do not plague the world under fluctuating exchange rates. Furthermore, American export firms began to chortle that falling dollar rates made American goods cheaper abroad, and therefore benefitted exports. It is true that governments persisted in interfering with exchange fluctuations ("dirty" instead of "clean" floats), but overall it seemed that the international monetary order had sundered into a Friedmanite utopia.

But it became clear all too soon that all is far from well in the current international monetary system. The long-run problem is that the hard-money countries will not sit by forever and watch their currencies become more expensive and their exports hurt for the benefit of their American competitors. If American inflation and dollar depreciation continues, they will soon shift to the competing devaluation, exchange controls, currency blocs, and economic warfare of the 1930s.

But more immediate is the other side of the coin: the fact that depreciating dollars means that American imports are far more expensive, American tourists suffer abroad, and cheap exports are snapped up by foreign countries so rapidly as to raise prices of exports at home (e.g., the American wheat-and-meat price inflation). So that American exporters might indeed benefit, but only at the expense of the inflation-ridden American consumer. The crippling uncertainty of rapid exchange-rate fluctuations was brought starkly home to Americans with the rapid plunge of the dollar in foreign-exchange markets in July 1973.

Since the United States went completely off gold in August 1971 and established the Friedmanite fluctuating fiat system in March 1973, the United States and the world have suffered the most intense and most sustained bout of peacetime inflation in the history of the world. It should be clear by now that this is scarcely a coincidence. Before the dollar was cut loose from gold, Keynesians and Friedmanites, each in their own way devoted to fiat paper money, confidently predicted that when fiat money was established, the market price of gold would fall promptly to its nonmonetary level, then estimated at about $8 an ounce.

In their scorn of gold, both groups maintained that it was the mighty dollar that was propping up the price of gold, and not vice versa. Since 1971, the market price of gold has never been below the old fixed price of $35 an ounce, and has almost always been enormously higher. When, during the 1950s and 1960s, economists such as Jacques Rueff were calling for a gold standard at a price of $70 an ounce, the price was considered absurdly high. It is now even more absurdly low. The far higher gold price is an indication of the calamitous deterioration of the dollar since "modern" economists had their way and all gold backing was removed.

It is now all too clear that the world has become fed up with the unprecedented inflation, in the United States and throughout the world, that has been sparked by the fluctuating fiat currency era inaugurated in 1973. We are also weary of the extreme volatility and unpredictability of currency exchange rates. This volatility is the consequence of the national fiat-money system, which fragmented the world's money and added artificial political instability to the natural uncertainty in the free-market price system. The Friedmanite dream of fluctuating fiat money lies in ashes, and there is an understandable yearning to return to an international money with fixed exchange rates.

Unfortunately, the classical gold standard lies forgotten, and the ultimate goal of most American and world leaders is the old Keynesian vision of a one-world fiat paper standard, a new currency unit issued by a World Reserve Bank (WRB). Whether the new currency be termed "the bancor" (offered by Keynes), the "unita" (proposed by World War II US Treasury official Harry Dexter White), or the "phoenix" (suggested by The Economist) is unimportant. The vital point is that such an international paper currency, while indeed free of balance-of-payments crises (since the WRB could issue as much bancors as it wished and supply them to its country of choice), would provide for an open channel for unlimited world-wide inflation, unchecked by either balance-of-payments crises or by declines in exchange rates.

The WRB would then be the all-powerful determinant of the world's money supply and its national distribution. The WRB could and would subject the world to what it believes will be a wisely-controlled inflation. Unfortunately, there would then be nothing standing in the way of the unimaginably catastrophic economic holocaust of world-wide runaway inflation, nothing, that is, except the dubious capacity of the WRB to fine-tune the world economy.

While a world-wide paper unit and central bank remain the ultimate goal of world's Keynesian-oriented leaders, the more realistic and proximate goal is a return to a glorified Bretton Woods scheme, except this time without the check of any backing in gold. Already the world's major central banks are attempting to "coordinate" monetary and economic policies, harmonize rates of inflation, and fix exchange rates. The militant drive for a European paper currency issued by a European central bank seems on the verge of success. This goal is being sold to the gullible public by the fallacious claim that a free-trade European Economic Community (EEC) necessarily requires an overarching European bureaucracy, a uniformity of taxation throughout the EEC, and, in particular, a European central bank and paper unit. Once that is achieved, closer coordination with the Federal Reserve and other major central banks will follow immediately. And then, could a World Central Bank be far behind? Short of that ultimate goal, however, we may soon be plunged into yet another Bretton Woods, with all the attendant crises of the balance of payments and Gresham's Law that follow from fixed exchange rates in a world of fiat moneys.

As we face the future, the prognosis for the dollar and for the international monetary system is grim indeed. Until and unless we return to the classical gold standard at a realistic gold price, the international money system is fated to shift back and forth between fixed and fluctuating exchange rates with each system posing unsolved problems, working badly, and finally disintegrating. And fueling this disintegration will be the continued inflation of the supply of dollars and hence of American prices which show no sign of abating. The prospect for the future is accelerating and eventually runaway inflation at home, accompanied by monetary breakdown and economic warfare abroad. This prognosis can only be changed by a drastic alteration of the American and world monetary system: by the return to a free market commodity money such as gold, and by removing government totally from the monetary scene.