降息幻象

降息幻象

謝國忠/文總第226期出版日期：2008-12-08

謝國忠搜狐博客http://xieguozhong.blog.sohu.com/

中國的利率政策僅是在藉款人、銀行和存款人之間分配利益，而不是刺激或冷卻經濟

股市對中國“4萬億元”財政刺激計劃作出了正面反應。再加上奧巴馬政府可能出台超過5000億美元的財政刺激計劃，市場預期經濟或將復蘇，從而大幅反彈。從11月20日起，連續七個交易日，標準普爾500指數反彈19％，恆生指數反彈15％。

對中美兩國財政刺激計劃的樂觀情緒，在這場復甦中起了重要作用。降低利率和援救花旗也對反彈有所助益。在信貸危機中，財政刺激比降低利率更加有效。

美國降息之鑑

降低利率是通過刺激貸款需求而發生作用。流動性是短期貸款的委婉說法。 “格林斯潘神話”（指他的利率政策能使經濟迅速反應）是一個泡沫現象。格林斯潘通過調整利率，改變資產投機的貸款需求。通過對資產價格的影響，格林斯潘玩轉了經濟。

經濟理論指出，貨幣政策是通過改變真實經濟中貸款需求來生效的。資產價格隨著貨幣政策波動，反映出對未來經濟活動的預期。但是，這種程度的資產價格變動不足 以影響經濟活動。當資產價格的波動隨著貨幣政策改變大到可以決定經濟活動時，它就是個泡沫。關於這個觀點，過去十年，我在多篇文章中多次闡述，強調“格林 斯潘神話”是一個泡沫。對於格林斯潘的鐵桿追隨者來說，現在應該醒醒了。

當信貸泡沫破滅時，降息是穩定因素。它減少了貸款人的利息成本和破產 的機率。但是，通過增加貸款需求，並不能給經濟活動再充電。更好的做法是印刷貨幣，並均勻地發給眾人。當信貸泡沫破滅時，債務人需要註銷債務。這可以通過 破產或者通脹實現。分發新印貨幣可以盡可能少地帶來扭曲，並通過通脹完成總體的債務削減。

美國家庭擁有的債務遠超過他們的收入。他們需要註銷債務，減少支出。如果美聯儲給每個美國公民印3萬美元，並發給他們，那麼，總計需印9萬億美元（美國家庭有14萬億美元的債務）。一些家庭沒有債務，可以保留這些錢。其他人可以支付他們的抵押貸款或者信用卡債務。

當然，這難免導致通脹和美元貶值。但只要印錢透明操作，就不會出現超調。美國真實經濟約有34萬億美元債務。如果美聯儲印9萬億美元，總體價格水平將大幅上升，美元將深幅貶值。二者均是為解決問題付出的合理代價。

美 國現行的貨幣政策是：一、降息來幫助債務人苟延殘喘；二、通過注資或者擔保貸款，挽救面臨困境的金融機構或者實體經濟中的企業。對後者，美聯儲承諾了8萬 億美元。但這些措施沒有解決問題，還獎賞了經營失敗的企業。它降低了經濟效率，引發未來不可預測的通脹。過低的利率可能導致大宗商品新一輪投機，使經濟形 勢更加惡化。美聯儲應該重新思考它的貨幣政策。

降息收效有限

相比美國，中國降低利率正面效應更少，負面效應更多。降低利率可 以刺激消費的說法是完全錯誤的。降低利率可能減少存款動機，因為存款回報下降了；同時，降息可以增加貸款需求，從而增加金融消費。前者由降低利率的負收入 效應抵消，後者在中國的效果很不明顯。中國的消費信貸幾乎是不存在的。降低利率刺激金融消費只是美好的願望。

中國的利率政策僅是在藉款人、銀 行和存款人之間分配利益，而不是刺激或冷卻經濟。過去十年，利率政策以存款人利益為代價，首先照顧了銀行，其次是藉款人的利益。存款利率僅為名義GDP增 幅的三分之一——這是中國有這麼多泡沫的根本原因。當利率過分低於名義經濟增速時，存款人會輕信任何掙快錢的方式。從股票和房地產到普洱茶和現代油畫，出 現了大大小小的泡沫，對中國經濟和社會產生了很大的危害。

股市中，首次炒股的天真股民損失了他們的存款。從事投機的人們看到投資組合的價值一 天的波動超過了他們的薪水，令他們失去了工作的意願。市場破滅，他們卻難以重拾舊業。很多城市依附於房地產開發賺來的錢。這些錢來得太容易：它們蓋房子就 像生產電視機一樣，卻預期房子能以高價賣出；在房地產出售之前，銀行給房地產開發商提供了數万億元貸款；這些錢最後又成為當地政府的收入。許多現代油畫的 價格飆升。市場將怪誕錯當做藝術，畫家們急急忙忙塗抹完越來越怪異的作品來滿足市場需求。在泡沫中，只要有人願意付錢，誰在乎作品的水準呢？

低利率導致的問題正困擾著我們。現在，政府聲稱解決問題的辦法就是降低利率。但這未必正確。傳統智慧認為，當經濟下滑，中央銀行應該降低利率。這在傳統的庫 存週期導致的經濟下滑是適用的。但當信貸泡沫破滅，降低利率就不會有如此明顯的效果。一個更好的做法是印鈔票，並在眾人中分發，拉高通脹，減少整體債務負 擔，同時保持相當高的利率水平。

中國正面臨經濟中三個困境。首先，全球需求下滑，減少了對中國的出口需求。其次，股票市場下跌抑制了奢侈品需求，特別是汽車這樣的高價商品。最後，房地產市場存貨大量積壓，減少了新房開發。

對於前兩個不利因素，沒有太多對策。中國政府已經提高了出口退稅率。這個政策意在提高出口企業的生存能力，避免不必要的倒閉。出口企業的收入只有全球經濟復 甦時，才會隨之增長。股票市場的下跌對奢侈品消費的負面效應無法扭轉。奢侈品市場存在泡沫，對奢侈品的強烈需求本來就是無法持續的。此外，中國的奢侈品價 格比其他更富有的國家還要高，明顯存在泡沫。在十

年前，我在東南亞見過類似的情形。這個市場需要調整。疲軟的需求逼迫著問題的解決。

應對房地 產存貨問題是存在有效政策措施的。美國房地產市場存在過度供給，許多家庭購買第二套住房完全是為了投機。當泡沫破滅，房子的數目就超過了家庭數目。但大多 數中國城市家庭仍然居住在年代久遠、質量較差的房子，他們更希望搬入新房子。但是，現在的房價是很多城市家庭年收入的近20倍，人們無力買房。如果價格下 滑，房子就能賣出去。所以，我建議減稅，例如將購房支出從收入稅中剔除，來出清這些存貨。

降低利率不會出清存貨。人們的承擔能力太弱，是否降 低利率不會有太大區別。如果採用貨幣政策來出清房地產存貨，更好的選擇是印貨幣並均勻發給眾人。例如，中央銀行可以給每人印2萬元人民幣。這使貧窮的家庭 能夠支付購房首付款，從而增加新的購買群體。當然，這將導致通貨膨脹。不過，通脹可以降低房屋真實價格，從而有利於清空存貨。只要貨幣擴張過程透明，就不 會引發惡性通貨膨脹，對社會和諧有益。

中國和美國應該在貨幣化問題上協調。雙方印鈔票的數量佔GDP比重應該相似，從而讓二者的貨幣聯繫起 來。這將減少貨幣化過程中的匯率波動。降低利率不會產生上述效果。另外，當信貸泡沫破滅後，經濟復甦有賴於債務註銷。降低利率也不會有這樣的效果。一個更 好的做法是印刷必要的鈔票並平均發給大家。

重視財政刺激風險

目前情況下，財政刺激肯定是有效的。由於資產貶值，債務人的資本變薄，信 貸市場無法有效運轉。正如上文討論的，通過製造通貨膨脹，削減債務，能使信貸市場重新繁榮。一個可行的替代辦法是通過財政刺激來增加債務人的收入，假以時 日，他們的資本基礎會得到改善。但這是一個緩慢的辦法，並會產生大量的公共債務。上世紀90年代，日本曾採用此法。它的國家債務超過了GDP的160％， 但是，它的經濟依舊蕭條。

中國宣布的“4萬億元”財政刺激計劃不全是新面孔。只有相對於舊的支出計劃的增量才是財政刺激計劃，現在要說出實際 金額尚早。一個間接辦法是觀察中央政府財政收支的變化，特別是發行政府債券。銀行融資是基礎設施建設的重要來源，中央政府新增支出可能帶動比自身規模更大 的投資。如果中央政府發行5000億元國債，並帶動5000億元銀行貸款給相關項目，刺激經濟的投資為1萬億元。我預測，明年投資總額可能接近這個數。

中國必須關注與財政刺激相關的兩個風險。

首先，低效率的工程不能帶來長期效益。已經有跡象顯示政府可能出現亂花錢的現象。原來被發改委暫停的項目又擺上桌面。中國政府的傾向是將項目惠及眾人。但這不是最理想的，中國不少地方不需要城市化或者工業化。它們的生態系統太脆弱，那裡的居民最終將遷走。

中國是個窮國，應該慎重使用財政刺激資金，將之投在促進國家長期發展的項目上。城市化可能是發展過程中最重要的一步。中國應該集中它的資源，興建超級城市。 中國人口是美國的4.3倍，居住用地是美國的一半。其他條件不變，中國的城市應該是美國的8.6倍。這聽上去很驚人，但很有意義。大多數人理解城市化有巨 大的基礎建設規模效應，卻不理解有創造工作的規模效應。考慮到勞動力的差異，大城市比小城市提供了更多的就業機會。

其次，現在批准地方政府發 債將造成災難。它將導致低效率支出和地方政府破產。最終，中央政府要對地方政府貸款負起責任。更好的做法是讓中央政府發債，並將貨幣發給地方政府。這是財 政改革的一部分。未來三至五年，地方政府的收入增加，再還給中央政府。中央政府可以發行國債為這些支出而融資。這減輕了地方政府的財政危機，使其未來的財 政收支更加穩固，還控制了地方政府破產的風險。

允許地方政府發債必須與中國城市化戰略結合起來。只有成功的城市才可能償還債務。中國城市化戰略應該帶動地方政府債券市場。在這個戰略清晰之前，地方政府債券市場不會發展起來。

將 財政刺激計劃的資金用來為失業人群謀福祉是更好的目標。經濟下滑可能導致2000萬流動人口失業。基礎設施建設可能會吸收部分失業人群。但是，失業人員全 部重新就業尚需時日。中國政府應該考慮到花一些錢，幫助這些人度過失業時期。人均500元或者每月100億元足夠解決他們的困難。這相比財政刺激計劃的規 模，支出要少得多，而且在經濟下滑時，能更有效地保持社會穩定。

一些地方政府正在出台一些政策，限制企業裁員。這是錯誤的。中國企業需要另一輪升級。如果企業被迫保留過剩的勞動力，它們的效率將下降，整個國家都要為此吃苦頭。

中國的宏觀政策轉向刺激經濟增長。這些刺激措施應該以最有效和最公正的方式展開。現在仍在刺激政策的前期。在細節上，需要慎重。 ■

The following was written Dec 1 and is in the current issue of Caijing Magazine. The current actions by central banks and governments are first for financial stabilization and second for boosting growth. The policy actions continue to ignore that the main problem is excessive indebtedness and only debt reduction could bring back normality. The debt reduction can be achieved either through bankruptcy or inflation. Cutting interest rate or boosting liquidity support for financial institutions couldn't solve the problem.


Fiscal stimulus alleviates the problem by allowing debtors to earn income to pay off debts gradually, i.e., turning private debt into public debt gradually like in Japan. Fiscal stimulus would work less effectively elsewhere than in Japan. American and Chinese companies don't want to keep excess labor like in Japan. Hence, fiscal stimulus can't stop unemployment rising quickly. The political pressure would grow sharply in China and the US to solve the problems as quickly as possible.



The most effective policy to end the current problem is for the Fed and China's PBoC to print money to distribute among their peoples evenly. The money can be used to pay down debts in the US and buy properties in China. The appropriate amount is probably similar to per capita income. As long as Rmb and dollar are tied during the monetization process, stability can be maintained. Andy



Caijing Magazine

8 Dec 2008

Andy Xie

On effective stimulus

China's announcement of ¥4 trillion fiscal stimulus was received positively by the market. Together with the announced intention of the incoming Obama Administration for a big fiscal stimulus, possibly over $500 billion, market bounced on the economic recovery hope. From the recent lows on Nov 20 S&P 500 bounced 19% and Hang Seng Index 15% within seven trading sessions. The optimism on the prospects for China and the US's fiscal stimulus played a major role in the market recovery. Interest rate cuts and the bailout of the Citigroup were of secondary importance. In a credit crisis fiscal stimulus is far more effective than cutting interest rate.

Cutting interest rate works through encouraging borrowing. Liquidity is a euphemism for short-term debt. Greenspan's magic-rapid economic response to his rate decisions was a bubble phenomenon. His rate decisions changed debt demand for asset speculation. Through its impact on asset prices he moved the economy. Economic theory says that monetary policy works through changing demand for debt in the real economy. Asset prices move with monetary policy in anticipation of the change to future economic activities. The magnitude of such asset price movement wouldn't be big enough to affect economic activities. When the magnitude of asset price change in response to monetary policy is big enough to determine economic activities, it is a bubble. I have written this point in different versions numerous times in the past ten years to emphasize that Greenspan's magic was a bubble. For the diehard Greenspan worshippers out there, wake up and smell the coffee!

When a credit bubble bursts, cutting interest rate is a stabilizing force. It decreases the interest payment for debtors and the incidence of bankruptcies. However, it couldn't recharge economic activities through increasing debt demand. A far better approach is to print money and distribute it evenly among people. When a credit bubble bursts, debtors need a write-off. It can be done through bankruptcy or inflation. Distributing printed money evenly among people causes the least distortion to achieve a general debt reduction through inflation.

The US households have too much debt versus their income. They need a write-off and spend less in the future. If the Fed prints $30 thousand per capita and distributes it to everyone American citizen, it would total $ 9 trillion versus $14 trillion of household debt. Some households don't have debts and can hang onto the money. Others will pay down their mortgages or credit card debts. Of course, there will be inflation and dollar depreciation. As long as the printing is done in a transparent fashion, there wouldn't be overshooting. The US real economy has about $34 trillion in debt. If the Fed prints $9 trillion, the general price level should rise by 26% and the dollar down by 21%. Both would be reasonable prices to pay for solving the problems.

The current monetary policy is (1) cutting interest rate to help debtors stay alive and (2) bailing out failing financial institutions or real economy businesses with capital injections and debt guarantees. The Fed has committed $8 trillion for the later. These approaches don't solve problems and reward bad companies. It decreases economic efficiency, and causes unpredictable inflation in future. Keeping interest rate so low may revive commodity speculation, causing great harm to a weak economy. The Fed should rethink its policy.

Cutting interest rate in China has less positive and more negative impact than in the US. It is totally false to claim that lowering interest rate would boost consumption. Lowering interest rate may decrease incentives for saving, as returns on bank deposits decline, and boost debt demand for financing consumption. The former is offset by the negative income effect from lowering interest rate. The later is minimal in China. Chinese consumer credit is virtually non-existent. It is wishful thinking to hope for this effect in cutting interest rate.

China's interest rates are about dividing benefits among borrowers, banks, and savers, not about boosting or cooling the economy. For the past ten years the interest rate policy has been against savers in favor of banks first and borrowers second. The deposit rates have been kept at one third of the growth rate of nominal GDP. It is the root cause for so many bubbles in China. When interest rate is so low against economic growth rate, savers become credulous about all sorts of quick money schemes. From stocks and properties to puer tea and modern paintings bubbles have happened big and small, doing great damages to the Chinese economy and society.

Naïve first-time investors in the stock market have lost their savings. Many people who speculated in the market and saw their portfolios fluctuating in a day more than their salaries have lost desire to hang onto their jobs. The market burst may not bring them back to their previous occupations. Numerous cities have become hooked onto the money from property development. The money was so easy for them: they were building properties like manufacturing TV sets but assumed the properties would sell at antique prices; banks lent trillions to developers for property construction before the properties could be sold; the bank loans had become local government revenues. Many modern paintings have been ramped up hundreds of times in prices. The market mistook weirdness for art, and painters rushed out weirder and weirder stuff to satisfy the market. In a bubble, who cares, as long as someone else would pay a higher price down the road. I dare to predict that some of the hottest paintings in the past three years will drop over 90% in value.

The low interest rate caused the problems that are haunting us. Now, governments say the solution is lower interest rate. Somehow, it doesn't sound right. Conventional wisdom says that a central bank should cut interest rate when economy turns down. That is true in a conventional downturn driven by inventory cycle. After a credit bubble bursts, cutting interest rate has much less punch. A better approach is to print money and distribute among people to cause inflation that decreases general debt burden, while keeping interest rate relatively high.

China is facing three headwinds in its economy. First and foremost, declining global demand is cutting China's exports. Second, stock market bursting is dampening luxury consumption demand, especially for big ticket items like automobile. Third, the property sector is experiencing a huge inventory overhang, which decreases new property development.

There aren't many measures to deal with the first two negative factors. Chinese government has already increased VAT rebates for the exporters. The policy purpose in the current environment should be to enhance their survivability and avoid unnecessary bankruptcies. Their revenues would only recover with the global economy. The negative effect on luxury consumption from the stock market decline cannot be reversed. The market was a bubble. The strong luxury demand was unsustainable anyway. Besides, the luxury prices in China are much higher than in other and richer countries. It was a bubble phenomenon. I saw something similar in Southeast Asia ten years ago. The market needs to normalize. The demand weakness is forcing the issue.

There are effective policies to deal with the property inventory. The US property market has absolute oversupply. Many households were buying second homes purely for speculation. When the bubble bursts, there are just too many houses against the number of households. Most Chinese urban households still live in old and low quality flats. They would prefer the new flats. But, the price level, around 20 times household income in many cities, makes the purchase impossible. If the prices come down, the flats can be sold. I have suggested tax reductions (e.g., decreasing transaction taxes and making purchase deductible from income tax) to clear the inventory.

Cutting interest rate won't clear the inventory. The affordability is too low for interest rate to make a big difference. If monetary policy is to be used for clearing the property inventory, it would be better to print money and distribute it evenly among people. For example, the central bank could print Rmb 20 thousand per capita. It will give poor households the money for down payment, bringing a new buyer group. Of course, it would lead to inflation, which decreases property price in real terms and is what's needed to clear the inventory. As long as the monetary expansion is transparent, it won't lead to hyperinflation and would be good for social harmony.

Maybe China and the US should coordinate in monetization. The pair can print similar amounts of money relative to their GDP and keep their currencies linked up. It would decrease exchange rate volatility during monetization. After a credit bubble bursts economic revival depends on a debt writeoff. Cutting interest rate doesn't achieve that. A better approach is to print the necessary amount of money and distribute it evenly among people.

Fiscal stimulus is certainly effective in the current environment. The credit market is not functioning effectively as declining asset prices have made the capital base of borrowers too thin. As discussed above, debt reduction through inflation could revive the credit market. An alternative is for fiscal stimulus to boost their income. Overtime, their capital base improves. This is a slow approach and may require massive buildup of public debt. Japan adopted this approach in the early 1990s. Its national debt has surpassed 160% of GDP and, yet, its economy is still sluggish.

China's announced fiscal package of Rmb 4 trillion is not all new money. Only the increase against the old spending plan is the stimulus part. It is too early to tell the exact amount yet. An indirect observation is to observe the change in the fiscal position of the central government, especially the issuance of government bonds. As bank financing plays a big part in infrastructure projects, the increased spending by the central government would have a bigger effect. If the central government issues Rmb 500 billion of treasury bonds and it leads to Rmb 500 bn of bank financing for related projects, the total amount of stimulus is about Rmb 1 trillion. I suspect that the total stimulus would be close to that next year.

China must watch two risks associated with fiscal stimulus. First, low efficiency projects could be funded with little long-term benefit. There are indications that wasteful spending could be coming. Reportedly, local government representatives were lining up at the National Development and Reform Commission ('the NDRC') for handouts. Projects that were short down by the NDRC were brought back. China's tendency is to spread the projects around to make all happy. This is not optimal. Most places in China should not urbanize or industrialize. Their ecosystem is too fragile and their local population would migrate eventually.

China is a poor country. The money for fiscal stimulus should be used carefully to promote the country's long term development. Urbanization is probably the most important part of the development process. As I have written for the past decade, China must concentrate its resources to build super cities. China's population is 4.3 times the US's with half as much habitable land. Ceteris paribus, China's cities should be 8.6 times as big as the US's. It may sound frightening but makes a lot of sense. Most would understand that urbanization has huge economies of scale in infrastructure development. Less understood are the economies of scale in job creation. By allowing greater division of labor large cities offer more job opportunities than small cities.

Local government issuing bonds has become a hot topic. It would be a disaster to allow it at present. It would lead to wasteful spending and local government bankruptcy. Ultimately, the central government would be liable for local government debt. It is much better for the central government to issue bonds and distribute the money to local governments. It could be part of fiscal reform. For example, the share of fiscal revenue for local governments could be boosted by five percentage points and be applicable retroactively for 3-5 years. The central government could issue bonds to fund the cost. It alleviates the fiscal crisis at local government level, put their fiscal position at a more solid ground in the future, and contains the risk of local government bankruptcies.

The right for local governments to issue bonds must be tied up with China's urbanization strategy. Only successful cities would be able to repay their debts. Local government bond market should develop in conjunction with China's urbanization strategy. Before the strategy is clear, the local government bond market shouldn't develop.

It may serve a better purpose for China to spend its fiscal stimulus money on unemployment benefits. The economic downturn may cause 20 million migrant workers to lose jobs. Infrastructure projects could absorb some. But it would take time for all to be employed. Chinese government should consider allocating some stimulus money to help them through the tour period. Rmb 500 per person or Rmb 10 billion per month in total could alleviate their difficulties, I believe. This amount is relatively small compared to the size of the stimulus package and would be an effective support for social stability during the economic downturn.

Some local governments are issuing policies to restrict layoffs at businesses. This would be wrong. Chinese companies need to upgrade to generate another growth cycle. Without being able to restructure their labor force they can hardly upgrade. If companies are forced to keep excess labor, the business sector will decline in efficiency and the whole country would suffer. Companies should be allowed to restructure to achieve maximum efficiency. Governments should use fiscal levers to help the affected workers.

China's macro policy has shifted t a simulating stance. The stimulus should be deployed in the most efficient and equitable manner. It is still early days in the stimulus policy. Care must be taken to fill in the details.