謝國忠：暫時的平衡

謝國忠：戲法何時休

2009-08-17

不穩定的平衡

本文見《財經》雜誌2009年第17期出版日期2009年08月17日
　　　

舊平衡一去不復返，創建新平衡，要面臨許多結構性的障礙。目前的復蘇只是基於一個暫時的、不穩定的平衡

美國經濟已開始報告強勁增長的數據。分析師們正提高其對美國經濟前景的預期，有的預計年化增長幅度在3％-4％。二季度經濟數據顯示，中國表現出 快速反彈，美國在三季度也會有同樣的表現。難道全球經濟都在上演V型反彈？這是在過去三個月裏，活躍的金融市場一直盼望的情景。市場押對了嗎？

最持久的泡沫

2008年年底，我曾預測，全球股市會在2009年春季上演一輪強勁反彈，全球經濟會在下半年開始回升。之後，在2010年出現第二波探底。

在正常的經濟週期中，庫存帶動的經濟復蘇，必然繼之以企業資本支出，而這將擴大就業。就業人數的增加導致消費增長，從而提高企業盈利能力，再擴大 資本支出。但是，為什麼現實並非如此呢？原因在於巨大的泡沫扭曲了全球經濟結構。供給和需求的重新匹配將需要很長時間。凱恩斯主義僅僅關注總需求，忽視了 結構性失衡。正常情況下，凱恩斯主義是說得過去的。然而，一旦經濟衰退源於巨大泡沫的破裂，凱恩斯主義就束手無策了。

事實上，許多政策制定者從“創造新泡沫，以抵消舊泡沫破裂引發的經濟衰退”這個出發點思考。這類想法在中國和華爾街特別流行。儘管世界各地的中央 銀行並非有意如此，但是，他們又創造了另一堆流動性泡沫。泡沫首先清楚地體現在大宗商品價格飆升上，接下來是股市，近來又體現在房地產市場上。這個戰略會 成功嗎？我不這麼看。

泡沫能夠持續多久，取決於它對需求的影響。最持久的是資產和技術泡沫。資產泡沫的乘數效應體現在很多方面。在短期內，資產泡沫既刺激了投資，也刺 激了消費，它影響的供應鏈頗長。在供給方，從商品生產者到房地產仲介，泡沫可以對經濟總量的五分之一產生刺激效果。在需求方，它不僅能刺激信貸增長，提高 金融部門收益，而且往往能夠通過財富效應提高消費。正是因為資產泡沫如此強大，它的破裂造成的負面影響就極具破壞性。因為當泡沫存在的時候，出現供給過剩 需要一定時間來消耗，還會破壞信用體系。

當投資者們誇大技術對其企業盈利影響的時候，技術泡沫就此產生。一項突破性的技術，會極大提升生產率。然而，競爭會將技術進步帶來的暫時的超額收 益轉變為更低的消費價格。由於重要技術的出現會降低消費價格，中央銀行往往釋放了過多貨幣進入資本市場，創造了泡沫。但因基礎技術導致了經濟繁榮，所以， 人們感覺這些泡沫十分真實。越來越多的資本投入到這一技術中去，這就導致產能過剩，並抵消掉超額利潤。當投機者最終認識到企業不復盈利的時候，泡沫就破滅 了。技術泡沫的代價，本質就是過度投資。因為突破性的技術會使經濟體擴大，從而吸收技術泡沫帶來的負面影響變得更加容易，因此經濟也能相對快速地復蘇。

暫時的平衡

我們現在看到的，是在全球經濟中堆積的純粹的流動性泡沫。它體現在幾個資產類別上，最突出的是大宗商品、股票和政府債券。支撐泡沫的理由是，刺激 將導致經濟快速復蘇，而且，產出缺口能夠保持低通貨膨脹率，因而中央銀行可以把利率數年內維持在較低水準。根據這個描述，投資者可以同時期待強勁的企業盈 利和較低的利率水準，也就是股市所謂的“金髮姑娘”（語出Robert Southey的童話，此處“金髮姑娘”形容上世紀90年代中後期的美國經濟，即一個“穩步增長，通脹溫和”、處於童話般的美好狀態，但“三隻熊”回來， 一切就結束了）。

中國二季度和美國三季度發生的事情，似乎可以支援上述觀點。我認為，市場被誤導了。目前反彈的驅動力量，是庫存週期和政府刺激。企業資本支出和消 費的跟進，被結構性挑戰嚴重製約著。這些挑戰都源於資源分配不當導致的泡沫。泡沫破裂後，供應和需求之間的不匹配，限制了刺激或泡沫創造需求的效力。

結構性挑戰來自全球經濟失衡，以及由於過去的廉價信貸和高資產價格的支援，誇大了需求，由此導致產業過度擴張。在全球層面上，失衡體現在盎格魯- 撒克遜經濟體（澳大利亞，英國和美國）出現的赤字和新興經濟體（主要是中國和石油出口國）的盈餘之間的不平衡上。大體上看，不平衡相當於1萬億美元或全球 GDP的2％的水準。

最近的數據顯示，美國家庭儲蓄率在大幅度增加。在兩年內，它從-2％上升到5％以上。但是，目前的水準仍然低於8％的歷史平均水準。如果經濟正常 化進程仍沿既定軌道運行，儲蓄率應該能增加到8％以上，並很有可能超過10％，債務水準也將下降到歷史平均水準。有人認為，如果低利率使房地產市場再度復 蘇，美國家庭可能會再次變得願意借錢消費了。這種情況是可能的，但希望不大。未來，要麼會出現經濟正常恢復，要麼就是由泡沫激發的經濟繁榮，結局取決於美 國家庭儲蓄率的前景。除非美國家庭部門願意再次借錢來花，否則，新興經濟體無法重返出口帶動增長的模式。

如果人們假定美國家庭儲蓄率將繼續上升，那麼，新興經濟體必須降低其儲蓄率，增加投資或者減少生產，最好的辦法莫過於降低儲蓄率。但是，儲蓄率並 不是說降就降的。其主要取決於人口特徵以及財富水準。立竿見影的方法就是增加家庭財富，減少其儲蓄率，製造資產價格泡沫。不少人主張把中國股市炒起來，使 資產膨脹，這些人心裏打的就是這個主意。

一些分析師預計，上世紀80年代後期日本經濟出現的泡沫，將在中國重現。當時，由於“廣場協議”的影響，日元幣值翻了1倍，日本以出口為主導的增長模式因此受阻。為了刺激內需以穩定經濟，日本縱容了大規模的資產泡沫的產生。短期內，資產價格膨脹或許算是一個出路。

實際上，中國不必重蹈日本的覆轍。首先，1985年日本已經是發達國家，不可能將其龐大的儲蓄轉移到基礎設施投資上。中國的城市化進程仍有20％至30％的路要走。如果能建立正確的機制，足可以把更多的儲蓄轉移到城市化過程中去。

其次，中國可以通過結構性改革，大幅降低儲蓄率。在中國儲蓄總量中，一半來自公共部門。政府和國有企業應該減少其不斷升高的留存收益，並增加投融 資的貸款比例。例如，中國較高的資產價格，就是源於地方政府有增加財政收入以支援投資的需要。如果中國的資產價格削減三分之一，國民儲蓄率可能會降低2個 －3個百分點。

第三，中國政府可以將其在上市國有企業擁有的股份，轉移到家庭部門。家庭財富增加，可導致國民儲蓄率降低3個－4個百分點。

中國的出口下降了大約五分之一。要保證經濟正常運行，就需要國民儲蓄率下降約6個百分點。否則，經濟不是面臨衰退，就是引發泡沫。出現泡沫的目的，正如上文所說，就是為了暫時降低儲蓄率。

以上討論聽起來與目前經濟復蘇的可持續性的分析相悖。這麼說，是要引出兩個觀點：一、舊的平衡一去不復返；二、創建新的平衡，要面臨許多結構性的 障礙。目前的復蘇只是基於一個暫時的、不穩定的平衡，其中，一是美國通過增加財政赤字來減緩其國民儲蓄率的上升，二是中國通過提升其政府支出和創造資產泡 沫來減少其儲蓄盈餘。這個暫時的平衡取決於政府的行動。

戲法何時收手

然而，正在改善的經濟數據將刺激金融市場。由於中國政府擔心一個更大的泡沫的降臨，因此，正在強迫股市降溫。在接下來的兩個月內，其他地區的市場情況可能不錯。不同的趨勢說明，中國領先其他國家四個月，實現了市場復蘇及調整。

當投資者認識到，全球經濟在2010年將有第二次下降，並且美聯儲將很快提高利率的時候，金融市場將再次下滑。轉捩點很可能發生在今年四季度的某 個時間。到那時，很顯然，中國經濟已經放慢了速度，美國的就業沒有得到改善，因此，其消費量一直處於停滯狀態。存貨週期按照常規發展過後，目前推動預期的 生產數據已經變冷。

多數分析師會說，如果經濟復蘇還不確定的話，央行不會提高利率。問題是，貨幣政策不能解決阻礙持續復蘇的結構性問題。流動性不是治療目前全球經濟的良藥，過量使用會帶來通貨膨脹的負面影響。

傳統的看法認為，通貨膨脹不會在經濟疲軟的時候出現，因為此時產能利用率低，企業無法提高價格。當存在結構性不平衡時，這種“一維思維”並不適 用。首先，瓶頸可能出現在多個領域中。過剩的流動性往往會流向流動性不足的領域。價格在這些領域可能會猛增，這將提升通貨膨脹率的預期，並引發普遍的通貨 膨脹。另一種可能性是，預期本身就足以帶來普遍的通貨膨脹。

導致通貨膨脹的驅動力就是流動性。金融市場非常發達，散戶投資者現在可以通過購買單一的或一籃子商品的交易所交易基金來表達他們對通貨膨脹的恐懼。

石油是最有可能導致通貨膨脹的商品。儘管需求下降，它的價格仍從3月的低點翻了一番。但也是惟一適合作為通貨通脹對衝的商品。其供應的反應是非常 滯緩的。超過全球石油儲量的80％屬於主權國家政府。它們不會用擴大生產來對物價上漲做出反應。事實上，當它們的預算需求得到滿足，高油價可能會降低它們 增加生產的願望。需求也不會因物價上漲而迅速下降。油對於日常經濟活動是必不可少的，以至於其消費量減少有很大的乘數效應。由於在需求和供應方面其價格敏 感性都較低，它特別適合吸收多餘的流動性，並在其他商品之前反映通貨膨脹預期。

只要經濟繼續疲弱，那麼，如果央行拒絕提高利率，石油價格就可能會翻番。我認為，中央銀行，尤其是美聯儲，將在明年年初甚至今年年底開始提高利 率，儘管並不情願。只是想通過顯示他們仍然關心通貨膨脹來冷卻通脹預期。因此，他們會慢慢地提高利率，即故意落後於形勢。結果是通貨膨脹率的上升將快於利 率，這是負債的美國家庭部門所需要的。

這種愚弄市場的策略可能暫時奏效。它的有效性一定會反映在石油價格上，即，美聯儲需要在其利率政策中將石油價格作為目標。如果石油價格脫離了目前的水準，這意味著市場不再相信美聯儲了。這將迫使美聯儲快速提高利率，不幸的是，這會觸發另一波嚴重衰退。

應該用W型代替V型復蘇。儘管明年的下滑在統計上可能不深，卻將傳遞出影響深遠的心理衝擊。金融市場現在很活躍，因為其仍相信政府。第二波下滑將顯示政府力量有限。這波下滑或會使資產價格下跌，並保持很長一段時間。 ■
　　　

作者為《財經》雜誌特約經濟學家、玫瑰石顧問公司董事

Andy Xie/August 15, 2009


　　The US economy is beginning to report strong growth data. Analysts are upgrading their outlook for the US economy. It is now expected to grow at annualized pace of 3-4%. China showed quick rebound in its economic data in the second quarter. Now the US is doing so in the third quarter. Is the global economy staging a V-shaped bounce? In the past three months the buoyant financial market has been expecting this. Is the market right?


　　At the end of last year I expected global stock market to stage a big bounce in the spring of 2009 and the global economy to stage a rebound in the second half. I also expected analysts to upgrade their outlook at about the current time. I warned then that the economic pickup was due to inventory cycle and stimulus, and the global economy would have a second dip in 2010.


　　In a normal economic cycle inventory-led recovery would be followed by corporate capex, which leads to employment expansion. Rising employment leads to consumption growth, which expands profitability and more capex. Why wouldn’t it work this? The reason, as I argued in this page before, is that the big bubble distorted the global economic structure. The re-matching of supply and demand will take a long time. The process is called Schumpeterian creative destruction. The Keynesian thinking ignores structural imbalance and focuses only on aggregate demand. In a normal situation the Keynesian thinking is ok. However, when a recession is caused by the bursting of a big bubble, the Keynesian thinking no longer works.


　　Many policymakers actually don’t think along the line of Keynes vs. Schumpeter. They think in terms of creating another bubble to fight against the recession impact of a bubble bursting. This type of thinking is especially popular in China and on Wall Street. The central banks around the world, though they haven’t been deliberate, have created another liquidity bubble. It has manifested itself in surging commodity prices first, stock markets next, and lately in some property markets also. Would this strategy succeed? I don’t think so.


　　How long a bubble lasts depends on its impact on demand. The most lasting are property and technology bubbles. The multiplier effect of a property bubble is multifaceted. It stimulates both investment and consumption in the short term. The supply chain that it impacts is very long. From commodity producers to real estate agencies it could stimulate over one fifth of an economy on the supply side. On the demand side it stimulates credit growth and financial sector earnings, and often boosts consumption through the wealth effect. Because the property bubble is so powerful, the negative effect from its bursting is very damaging, because the excess supply during the bubble takes time to consume, and it destroys the credit system.


　　A technology bubble happens when investors exaggerate its impact on corporate earnings. A breakthrough technology like the internet improves productivity enormously. However, most of its benefit goes to consumers. Competition eventually shifts temporary high corporate profitability to lower consumer prices. Because the emergence of an important technology brings down consumer price, central banks often release too much money that travels into asset markets and create bubbles. As the underlying technology leads to an economic boom, the bubble feels real. More and more capital pours into the technology. It leads to overcapacity and destruction of profitability. The bubble bursts, when speculators finally realize that the corporate earnings wouldn’t come. The cost of a technology bubble is essentially the overinvestment. Because a breakthrough technology expands the economic pie, it makes it easier to absorb the cost of a technology bubble. Economy can recover relatively quickly.


　　A pure bubble in one or multiple financial assets due to excess liquidity doesn’t last long. Its multiplier impact on the broad economy is limited. It could have some impact on consumption due to the wealth effect. As it doesn’t stimulate the supply side nor boosts productivity, whatever story it is based on will have holes apparent to speculators. It doesn’t take long for them to flee. Further, a pure liquidity bubble without productivity support can easily lead to inflation, which causes tightening expectation that triggers the bursting of the bubble.


　　What we are seeing now is a pure liquidity bubble in the global economy. It has manifested itself in several asset classes. The most prominent are commodities, stocks, and government bonds. The story that supports this bubble is that the stimulus would lead to a quick economic recovery and the output gap could keep inflation down and, hence, central banks can keep interest rates low for a couple more years. Therefore, according to this story, investors could look forward to strong corporate earnings and low interest rates at the same time, sort of a goldilocks scenario for stock market.


　　What have occurred in China in the second quarter and the US in the third quarter seems to lend support to this view. I think the market is misled. The driving forces for the current bounce are inventory cycle and government stimulus. The follow-through from corporate capex and consumption are severely contained by structural challenges. These challenges have their origins in the bubble that led to misallocation of resources. After the bubble burst, the mismatch between supply and demand limits the effectiveness of either stimulus or bubble in creating demand.


　　The structural challenges arise from global imbalance and over expanded industries due to exaggerated demand that cheap credit and high asset prices supported in the past. At the global level the imbalance between deficit Anglo-Saxon economies (Australia, the UK, and the US) on the one hand and surplus emerging economies (mainly China and oil exporters) on the other. Roughly, the imbalance was $1 trillion or 2% of global GDP. The imbalance was supported by (1) the willingness of the central banks among surplus emerging economies to hold down their exchange rates and recycle their surpluses into the deficit economies by purchasing their government bonds, (2) the willingness of consumers in the deficit countries to spend with borrowed money, and (3) the Wall Street’s ability to dress up high risk consumer loans as low risk derivative products. I am describing these factors to show that it is unlikely that central banks could revive yesterday’s equilibrium.


　　The recent data point to sharp increase in the household savings rate in the US. In two years it has risen above 5% from -2%. The current level is still below the historical average of 8%. If normalization remains on track, it should rise above 8%, probably above 10%, to bring debt level down to the historical average. Some argue that, if the low interest rate revives property market again, American households may become willing to borrow and spend again. This scenario is possible but not likely. The US has not experienced serial property bubbles in the past. The reason is that its land is privately owned and plentiful. The supply overhang from one bubble takes a long time to digest. And, American culture tends to swing to frugality after a bubble. One’s outlook either for a normal recovery or a bubble-inspired boom depends on the outlook for the US household savings rate. Unless the US household sector is willing to borrow and spend again, emerging economies can’t revive the export-led growth model.


　　If one accepts the US household savings rate will continue to rise, the emerging economies must decrease their savings rates, increase investment, or decrease production. The best choice is to decrease the savings rates. But savings rates are hard to change. They depend mainly on demographics and wealth level. The quickest possible way would be to create an asset bubble that inflates household wealth and decreases savings. Many advocates for inflating property and stock market in China have this effect on their mind. Japan’s bubble after the Plaza Accord in 1985 had its origin in the same dilemma. This approach, if it works, has catastrophic long-term consequences. Japan remains mired in stagnation two decades after its bubble began to burst.


　　Some analysts are expecting that China would repeat Japan’s bubble experience in the second half of 1980s. At the time Japan’s export-led growth model was stymied by the doubling of its currency value after the Plaza Accord. It tolerated a massive asset bubble to stimulate domestic demand to stabilize its economy. China’s export-led model is facing rising savings rate and declining import demand in the US. Asset inflation could be a way out in the short term.


　　China doesn’t need to repeat Japan’s experience. First, in 1985 Japan was a developed country. It couldn’t divert its vast savings into infrastructure investment. China’s urbanization still has 20-30 percentage points to go. If the right mechanism can be established, China could divert more savings into urbanization.


　　Second, China can decrease its savings rate substantially through structural reforms. Half of China’s gross savings are from the public sector. The government and state-owned enterprises should decrease their revenue raising and increase borrowing for funding investment. For example, China’s high property price is due to the need of local governments to raise revenues for funding investment. If China’s property prices are cut by one third, the national savings rate could decrease by two to three percentage points.


　　Third, Chinese government could give its shares in the listed state-owned enterprises to the household sector. The increased household wealth due to this factor could decrease national savings rate by 3-4 percentage points.


　　China’s exports are roughly down by one fifth. It needs the national savings rate to drop by about 6 percentage points for the economy to function normally. Otherwise the economy would experience either recession or bubble. The purpose of the bubble, as mentioned above, is to decrease savings rate temporarily.


　　The above discussion sounds like digression from the analysis on the sustainability of the current economic recovery. Its purpose is to bring out two points: (1) the old equilibrium is impossible to return to, and (2) there are many structural barriers to a new equilibrium. The current recovery is based on a temporary and unstable equilibrium in which (1) the US slows down the rise of its national savings rate by increasing fiscal deficit and (2) China boosts its government spending and inflates an asset bubble to decrease its savings surplus. This temporary equilibrium depends on government actions. It doesn’t have the market foundation to support sustained and rapid growth.


　　Nevertheless, the improving economic data will excite financial markets. China’s stock market is cooling because the Chinese government is jawboning it down, fearing the downside of a bigger bubble, and the economy is beginning to slow. Markets elsewhere will likely do well for the next two months. The diverging trends reflect that China’s market recovered four months before others’ and adjusts before others also.


　　Financial markets will turn down again when investors realize that the global economy will have a second dip in 2010 and the Fed will raise interest rate soon. The turning point may well be sometime in the fourth quarter. By then it would become apparent that (1) China has slowed down, (2) the US employment hasn’t improved and, hence, its consumption has remained stagnant, and (3) the production data that are pushing expectation now have cooled after the inventory cycle has run its course.


　　Most analysts would argue that central banks wouldn’t raise interest rates if the recovery isn’t on solid ground yet. As I argued above, the problem is that monetary stimulus couldn’t solve the structural problems that are blocking a sustained recovery. Liquidity is the wrong medicine for the global economy now. Overusing it brings out its side effect-inflation.


　　The conventional wisdom says that inflation wouldn’t happen in a weak economy: capacity utilization rate is low in a weak economy and, hence, businesses cannot raise prices. This one dimensional thinking is not applicable when there are structural imbalances. Bottlenecks could appear in a few areas first. Excess liquidity tends to flow to where there is shortage. The prices in those areas could surge, which would bring up inflation expectation and trigger general inflation. Another possibility is that expectation alone is sufficient to bring about general inflation.


　　Oil is the most likely commodity to lead inflation. Its price has doubled from the March low despite declining demand. The driving force for its inflation is liquidity. Financial markets are so developed now that retail investors could express their inflation fear by buying exchange traded funds in a single or a basket of commodities.


　　Oil is uniquely suited as an inflation hedging device. Its supply response is very low. Over 80% of the global oil reserves are with sovereign governments. They don’t respond to rising prices with more production. Indeed, when their budgetary needs are met, high prices may decrease their desire to increase production. The demand doesn’t drop quickly against rising prices either. Oil is essential for routine economic activities that its reduced consumption has a large multiplier effect. As its price sensitivities are low on both demand and supply side, it is uniquely suited to absorb excess liquidity and reflect inflation expectation ahead of other commodities.


　　If central banks refuse to raise interest rates as long as economies remain weak, oil price may double from here. I think that central banks, especially the Fed, will begin to raise interest rate early next year or even late this year. I don’t believe that they are willing to raise interest rate. They just want to cool inflation expectation by showing that they still care about inflation. Hence, they will raise interest rate slowly, i.e., deliberately behind the curve. The consequence is that inflation would rise faster than interest rate, which is what the indebted US household sector needs.


　　This fool-the-market strategy may work temporarily. Its effectiveness must be reflected in oil price, i.e., the Fed needs to target oil price in its interest rate policy. If oil price runs away from the current level, it means that the market doesn’t believe the Fed. It would force the Fed to raise interest rate quickly, which, unfortunately, would trigger another deep recession.


　　Instead of a V-shaped recovery, we may get a W instead. The dip next year, though may not be deep statistically, will deliver a profound psychological shock. Financial markets are buoyant now because they believe in the government. The second dip will demonstrate the limits to government power. The second dip could send asset prices down and keep them there for a long time.