謝國忠 : 又瘋狂了

本文見《財經》雜誌2009年第16期出版日期2009年08月03日

政府並沒有能力扭轉市場趨勢。然而，“政府不會讓市場'跳水'”這一想法，在中國股市裏根深蒂固

中國股市和房地產市場再起泡沫，這是由於銀行海量貸款刺激，加上對出現通脹的恐懼共同造成的。我認為，中國股市和房地產市場價值被高估了50％，甚至100％。這兩個市場很可能在今年四季度出現調整。

不過，在明年某個時候，兩個市場可能會再次爆發泡沫。美元再次轉強之日，也是美麗的泡沫破滅之時。嚴重的通脹將迫使美聯儲加息，或許會成為擊碎泡沫的催化劑。

中國資產市場已成為一個巨大的“龐式騙局”——價格完全靠升值預期來支撐。隨著越來越多的人和流動資金被吸入市場，價格被進一步哄抬，不斷驗證著 人們看多的預期。於是，又有更多的人加入這場狂歡。然而，到沒有足夠的流動資金來餵飽這頭“野獸”之時，泡沫也就破裂了。目前來看，流動性還不構成製約因 素。儘管上半年新增貸款達到7.4萬億元人民幣，但6月貸存款比例僅為66.6％（去年12月這一比例為65％），增幅甚微。這意味著，許多貸款沒有進入 實體經濟，而是成了資產市場交易的槓桿。中國房地產市場與1997年香港的情況極為相似。

泡沫隨美元起伏

中國資產泡沫源於流動性過剩，表現為較高的外匯儲備水準以及較低的貸存款比例。美元疲軟和出口強勁，造成了中國流動性過剩的狀況。

雖然目前中國正在經受出口疲軟的折磨，但弱勢美元使中國得以大肆釋放其在過去五年內積聚的流動性，而不必擔心貨幣貶值的風險。

其實，預言泡沫什麼時候破滅並不難。當美元再次變得強勢時，流動性將會重重地擊破泡沫。

不過，很難講美元何時會轉強。自1985年“廣場協議”後，美元就迎來了熊市，並在十年後的1995年觸底。然後，就是七年牛市。目前的美元熊市 始於2002年，從那時算起，美元指數（DXY）的價值已減少約35％。如果把上輪熊市作為標桿，目前的熊市可能會持續到2012年。 IT革命開啟了上一輪美元牛市，誰也說不準會不會有另一場技術革命，從而引領美元進入一個可持續的牛市。

當然，貨幣政策可以促成一個短暫而火爆的美元牛市。上世紀80年代初期，當時的美聯儲主席保羅沃爾克，用兩位數的幅度加息，以控制通脹。從那以後，美元升值的進程十分艱難。目前的局勢與此類似。照此發展，幾乎可以肯定，中國資本市場和經濟將會“硬著陸”。

泡沫能維持多久，取決於政府的流動性政策。目前的泡沫，很大程度上是由政府鼓勵銀行貸款和超低的銀行間利率造成的。由於美聯儲實行零利率政策，加 之美元疲軟，中國的外匯儲備水準很高，貸存款比例又很低，因此，造成流動性增加，將進一步擴大泡沫。然而，考慮到其他一些因素，可能會促使政府冷卻一下過 熱的情緒。

如果政府盡其所能製造流動性，那麼，當泡沫破滅時，連挽救的“彈藥”都沒有了。如果那時全球經濟已經恢復，中國經濟或許會隨著強勁的出口“軟著陸 ”，但資本市場“硬著陸”是必然的。相反，如果全球經濟那時依然疲弱，依照我個人觀點，股市、房地產市場和經濟都將出現“硬著陸”。

虛妄的“泡沫無害論”

“走走停停”的方法可能會降低這一風險。政府先是掀起了流動性“巨浪”，然後想關上這個“水閘”。當流動性被完全吸收時，市場也將失去動力。一旦市場下跌 到一定程度，政府可以引發另一波“巨浪”，使其再次煥發生機。這種做法，不但能夠保存“彈藥”，還能限制泡沫的規模，在泡沫最終破滅時，把危害降到可控範 圍內。我覺得，政府可能會採用這一策略。如果今後幾年內全球經濟仍將下滑，我們或許可以看到，中國的股票和房地產市場每年都要來這麼一次大波動。眼前，這 股向下的波動可能發生在“國慶節”前後。

很多人認為，中國沒有泡沫。高資產價格只是反映了中國高增長的潛力。沒人能肯定地說,這到底是真正的資產繁榮，還是只是泡沫。

我對中國資本市場的現狀看法很明確：存在大量泡沫。泡沫的爆裂將給整個國家帶來極壞的後果。但由於很多人正樂在其中，政府不會先發制人，消滅泡 沫。事實上，在政策決策層，許多人認為，泡沫有利於經濟復蘇。在美元疲弱時，這一說法聽起來有些道理，因為泡沫可以在經濟降溫時，帶來更多的流動性。當美 元復蘇時，中國的資本市場，也許整個經濟，都將出現“硬著陸”。我希望，那些大力鼓吹泡沫的人，能夠站出來，為造成損失承擔責任。

研究泡沫最基本的方法是看估價。評估房價，最重要的方法是衡量一下價格收入比和租金收益。目前，在全國範圍內，每平方米房價已經相當接近美國的平 均水準。而美國的人均收入是中國城市人均收入的7倍。中國房屋每平方米均價，相當於一般人三個月的工資收入，這一水準也許在世界上都是最高的。

就我所知，現在，很多房子都租不出去。平均租金收益，如果算上那些租不出去的房子的話，真是低得可憐。無論從百姓的購買力，還是預期的出租收入看，中國的房價都高得離譜。有些人認為，中國的房地產一向如此：房價越來越高。這是不對的。

中國房地產市場泡沫還有另外一面，即其在地方政府財政中所起的作用。土地銷售收入以及物業銷售帶來的稅收，佔了地方政府財政收入很大一塊，因此， 他們有很強的動力來刺激房地產市場發展。土地銷售往往被精心設計，以期重燃漲價預期。例如，那些以超高價格投標的土地，會被封為“地王”。最近，“地王” 往往被國有企業拍下。當國有企業借用國有銀行的錢，再通過土地競拍把錢還給地方政府，價格還有意義嗎？只不過是資金在政府的“大口袋”裏面滾來滾去罷了。 如果私人開發商試圖跟著國有企業追漲土地市場，無異於自殺。

股市從無“救世主”

股市又處於最後的瘋狂。無知的散戶投資者都被上升的勢頭吸引。他們再次夢想一夜致富。和過去一樣，散戶投資者通常會賠錢，特別是現在剛跳進股市的 那些人。最後的瘋狂往往不會持久。在中國，股市的轉捩點經常與政治日曆相關。散戶投資者普遍認為，政府不會讓股市在共和國60週年大慶之前掉下來。短期 內，這種信念會自我實現。從歷史經驗看，這一波上漲將在“十一”之前逐漸熄火。

“政府不會讓市場'跳水'”這一想法，在中國股市裏根深蒂固。在格林斯潘時代，金融市場相信他總會在危急時刻出手“救市”。但在現實生活中，在大勢發生逆 轉時，政府並沒有能力去扭轉市場趨勢。過去，中國股市大起大落，這表明政府根本無力阻止市場下跌。然而，這一虛構的信念仍然深深植根於投資者心裏。

有些政府智囊認為，泡沫的害處也許沒那麼大。一個流行的說法是，在泡沫起來時，錢從一個人的口袋進了另一個人的口袋，只要錢還在中國國內流動，就不會產生什麼長期危害。這麼說的人，應該看看日本和香港，看看泡沫究竟如何不出境而造成了巨大的破壞。

在泡沫之下，資源被用於製造更多泡沫。這些資源將被永久性浪費掉。例如，商人再也不願意把精力放在實體經濟中，轉而投入時間和精力，從事市場投 機。這意味著，未來的中國，將不會有具有全球競爭力的公司。儘管中國已經歷30多年的高增長，但很少有公司擁有全球競爭力。一連串的泡沫，可能是造成這一 現狀的主要原因。

現在的年輕一代，對真正的工作興味索然，反而沉迷於股市投機。相對於每月領固定薪水，他們更願意看到自己持有的股票價格在一天內變來變去，然後開 始產生幻覺，認為自己能在股市裏面掙到大錢。當然，他們中的大多數人可能會輸得一無所有，然後，可能就會做出一些極端的舉動。如此造成的社會後果可能相當 嚴重。

房市蜃樓

房地產泡沫通常導致經濟過熱。建築空置，代表著永久性損失。在中國，大多數人也許會嘲笑這一可能性。畢竟，13億人的住房需求幾乎是無限的。但 是，現實情況完全不是這樣。中國的城市居民人均佔有住房面積為28平方米，按國際標準來衡量的話，這一水準也相當高。中國的城市化率是50％左右，它可以 上升到70％-75％。以後，由於人口老齡化的原因，農村人口將會減少。因此，中國的城市人口會另外增加3億人。

如果我們假設，這些人都能夠負擔得起一處房產（以今天的價格來看，這個說法很可笑），中國的城市可能需要額外84億平方米住房。中國現在的工作， 已經完成了超過20億平方米的建設，現在還有足夠的土地能夠容納另一個20億平方米。每年建築業生產能力約為15億平方米。產能絕對過剩，即沒有足夠的人 來住滿所有的房屋，可能這一狀況很快就會出現。當這樣的情況出現時，後果是相當嚴重的。房地產價格可能大幅下降，正如日本在過去的20年中經歷的一樣，同 時，這將摧毀整個銀行系統。

房地產泡沫造成的最嚴重的損害，就是人口的變化。高樓價會降低人口出生率。當泡沫破滅的時候，房地產價格下降，低生育水準的文化觀念是無法改變 的。香港、日本、南韓、台灣在其發展進程中都經歷了房地產泡沫。在泡沫肆虐時期，他們的出生率下降，隨後，儘管政府激勵，這一狀況也沒有改變。單是中國的 計劃生育政策本身，就導致未來20年的人口災變。房地產泡沫使趨勢變得更加不可逆轉：即使政府放棄計劃生育政策，對出生率也不會有明顯影響。未來20年， 中國將面臨人口老齡化以及人口總數下降的局面。當然，房地產價格也將非常低，並一低再低。

泡沫除了造成再分配的凈虧損，還會帶來非常嚴重的社會後果。在股市泡沫中，大部分家庭會損失，而極少數人則賺得盆滿缽滿。中國的財富差距現像已非 常嚴重，泡沫使情況變得更糟。即使等到中國的城市化完成，相當部分的人，甚至是大多數人，可能都沒有什麼錢。這將造成社會不穩定。當大多數人都擁有財富， 並在社會中有一席之地的時候，市場經濟才是穩定和有效的。

總之，眼下市場的瘋狂不會持續很長時間。 “糾偏”可能發生在今年四季度。明年，由於中國仍有能力釋放出更多的流動性，可能會出現另一波熱潮。當美元恢復強勢時，可能在2012年，中國的股票和房地產市場，可能會像在亞洲金融危機期間一樣，遭遇雪崩。 ■

又瘋狂了/謝國忠

2009-08-03
謝國忠搜狐博客http://xieguozhong.blog.sohu.com/

Chinese stock and property markets have bubbled up again. It was fueled by bank lending and inflation fear. I think that Chinese stocks and properties are 50-100% overvalued. The odds are that both will adjust in the fourth quarter. However, both might flare up again sometime next year. Fluctuating within a long bubble could be the dominant trend for the foreseeable future. The bursting will happen when the US dollar becomes strong again. The catalyst could be serious inflation that forces the Fed to raise interest rate.

Chinese asset markets have become a giant Ponzi scheme. The prices are supported by appreciation expectation. As more people and liquidity are sucked in, the resulting surging prices validate the expectation, which prompts more people to join the party. This sort of bubble ends when there isn't enough liquidity to feed the beast.

謝國忠搜狐博客http://xieguozhong.blog.sohu.com/

Liquidity isn'ta constraint yet. Even though loans grew by 24.4% in the first half or Rmb 7.4 trillion, loan-deposit ratio increased only to 66.6% in June 2009 from 65% in December 2008. It means that many loans have not been spent in real economic activities and have merely supplied leverage for asset market transactions. China's property market is very similar to Hong Kong's in 1997.

The origin of the asset bubble in China is excess liquidity as reflected in high level of foreign exchange reserves and low loan deposit ratio. The low interbank rate defines how serious excess liquidity s. The massive buildup of liquidity in China was due to weak dollar and strong exports. As dollar entered a bear market in 2002, China's Rmb followed it down. The appreciation expectation drove liquidity to China. One fourth of China's foreign exchange reserves could be due to this factor.


China's productivity rose rapidly after it joined the WTO. The massive buildup in infrastructure and the relocation of manufacturing sector to China pushed up Chinese labor's productivity rapidly. At the same time, Chinese currency declined as it rose against the dollar less than its decline. The combination of rising productivity and weak currency led to the massive export growth. The resulting dollar earnings pumped up China's monetary system.


While China is experiencing weak exports now, the weak dollar allows China to release the liquidity saved up during the boom in the past five year without worrying about currency depreciation. How far would the bubble go and for how long?


It is not too hard to understand when the bubble would burst. When the dollar becomes strong again, liquidity could leave China sufficiently to pop the bubble. What's occurring in China now is no different from what happened in other emerging markets before. Weak dollar always led to bubbles in emerging economies that were hot at the time. When the dollar turns around, the bubbles inevitably burst.


It is difficult to tell when the dollar will turn around. The dollar went into a bear market in 1985 after the Plaza Accord and bottomed ten years later in 1995. It then went into a bull market for seven years. The current dollar bear market began in 2002. The dollar index ('DXY') has lost about 35% value since. If the last bear market is of useful guidance, the current one could last until 2012. But, there is no guarantee. The IT revolution began the last dollar bull market. The odds are that another technological revolution is needed for the dollar to enter a sustainable bull market.

However, monetary policy could start a short but powerful bull market for the dollar. In the early 1980s Paul Volker, the Fed Chairman then, increased interest rate to double digit rate to contain inflation. The dollar rallied very hard afterwards. Latin American crisis had a lot to do with that.

The current situation resembles then. Like in the 1970s the Fed is denying the inflation risk due to its loose monetary policy. The longer the Fed waits, the higher the inflation will peak. When inflation starts to accelerate, it would cause panic in financial markets . To calm the markets, the Fed has to tighten aggressively, probably excessively, which would lead to a massive dollar rally. This would be the worst possible situation: a strong dollar and a weak US economy. China's asset markets and the economy would almost surely go into a hard landing.

How far the bubble would go depends on the government's liquidity policy. The current bubble wave is very much driven by the government encouraging banks to lend and the super low interbank interest rate. As the Fed's interest rate is zero, the dollar is weak, China's foreign exchange reserves are high, and the loan deposit ratio is low, China could increase liquidity, which would expand the bubble further. However, other considerations may motivate the government to cool it off.

If the government pumps all the liquidity it can, it wouldn't have any ammunition left to revive it when it comes down. If the global economy has revived then, Chinese economy may have a soft landing with strong exports. The asset markets will certainly have a hard landing. However, if the global economy remains weak then, which is my view, both asset markets and the economy would have a hard landing. The political cost may be too great for the government to risk it all now.

A less risky approach is to adopt a stop-and-go approach. The government releases a wave of liquidity like now and then turns off the tap. Markets will run out of steam when it is all absorbed. When markets fall low enough, the government could release another wave to revive them. This approach makes the ammunition last and limit the bubble size, which contains the damage when the bubble eventually bursts. I suspect that that would be the government's policy. If the global downturn remains for the next few years, we could see that China's property and stock market experience big fluctuations every year. The downward movement of the current wave may happen around the National Day.


Many would argue that China isn't experiencing a bubble. The high asset prices just reflect China's high growth potential. One can never make an ironclad case to pin down an asset boom as a bubble. An element of judgment based on experience is inevitable when one calls a market boom a bubble. I have had a reasonably good record at calling bubbles in the past. I wrote my doctoral thesis arguing that Japan was a bubble in late 1980s, a long report at the World Bank in earl 1990s arguing that Southeast Asia was a bubble, research notes at Morgan Stanley in 1999 calling dotcom boom a bubble, and numerous research notes from 2003 onwards arguing that the US property market was a bubble. On the other hand I have never called something a bubble that turned out not to be a bubble.


I want to make myself perfectly clear on China's asset markets today. They are a big bubble. Its bursting will bring very bad consequences for the country. However, as so many are enjoying what's going on, I don't think the government would act preemptively to eliminate the bubble. Indeed, many, if not the majority, in the policy circle argue that the bubble is good for reviving the economy. This sort of thinking seems to work because the dollar is weak, as the bubble can be revived with more liquidity when it cools off. When the dollar revives, China's asset markets and, probably, the economy would have a hard landing. I hope that the people who advocate the benefits of the bubble would stand up then to accept the responsibilities for the damages .

The most basic approach in studying bubbles is to look at valuation. For property the most important measures are price to income ratio and rental yield. China's average price per square meter nationwide is quite close to the average in the US. The US's per capita income is seven times China's urban per capita income. The nationwide average price is about three months of salary per square meter, probably the highest in the world. As far as I can tell, a lot of properties can't be rented out at all. Those that can bring in 3% yield, barely compensating for depreciation. The average rental yield, if one including those that can't be rented out, is probably negligible. China's property price doesn't make sense from affordability or yield perspective. Some argue that China's property is always like this: appreciation is the return. This is not true. The property market dropped dramatically from 1995-2001 during a strong dollar period.

A special angle in China's property bubble is its role in local government finance. As land sales and taxes from property sales account for a big portion of local government revenues, they have powerful incentives to pump up the property market. Land sales are often carefully managed to spike up expectation. For example, those who bid extraordinarily high prices for land are laurelled as land kings. Lately, the land kings are often state-owned enterprises. When state-owned enterprises borrow from state owned band and give the money to local governments at land auctions, why should the prices be meaningful? The money circulates within the big government pocket. Tomorrow's non-performing loans, if land prices collapse, are just today's fiscal revenues. If private developers follow the SoEs to chase the skyrocketing land market , they could be committing suicide.

The stock market is in a final frenzy again. The most ignorant retail investors are being sucked in by the rising momentum. They again dream of getting rich overnight. As in the past, retail investors usually lose, especially like the ones jumping in now. The final frenzy usually doesn't last. The turning points in China are often related to political calendar. Retail investors hold the popular belief that the government won't let the market drop before October 1, the 60th anniversary of the PRC. Last time it was the 17th Party Congress in October 2007. This sort of belief is self-fulfilling in the short term. The market tends to roll over around the time. If the past is of meaningful guidance, this wave will taper off before October.


The idea that the government wouldn't let the market drop is rooted in Chinese market psychology. In financial jargon, it is called a put option. During the Greenspan era, financial markets believed that he would always bail out markets in a crisis, which was the so-called Greenspan put. The belief in China should be called the Panda put. However, in reality, the government couldn't reverse the market trend when it turns. Chinese stock market has big ups and downs in the past, which shows the government's inability to stop the market from falling. Nevertheless, this imaginary put option remains deeply rooted in popular psychology.


Many policy thinkers believe that bubbles are not that harmful. One popular theory is that in a bubble money is passed from one person to another and, as long as it remains in China, no permanent harms can be done. Hence, if people are happy now and unhappy tomorrow, they just cancel each other. They should look at Japan and Hong Kong to see how much damage a bubble can do even without leaking money out of a country.


In a bubble resources are diverted to bubble making activities. The resources will be permanently wasted. For example, businessmen in China are reluctant to focus on real economic activities and are devoting time and energy to market speculation. It means that China wouldn't have many globally competitive companies in the future. Even though China has had three decades of high growth, few companies are globally competitive. The serial bubble making in the Chinese economy may be the reason.

A generation of young people is not interested in real jobs and is addicted to stock market speculation. They see their holdings changing in value in a day more than their monthly salary and have the illusion that they would make a lot of money in the market. Of course, most of them will lose everything and may take extreme actions afterwards. The social consequences could be quite serious.

A property bubble usually leads to overbuilding. The empty buildings represent permanent losses. Most people would laugh at such a possibility in China. After all, 1.3 billion would need unlimited properties. The reality is quite different. China's urban living space is 28 square meters per person, quite high by international standard. China's urbanization is about 50%. It could rise to 70-75%. Afterwards the rural population would decline on its own due to its high average age. So China's urban population may rise by another 300 million people. If we assume they all can afford property (a laughable notion at today's price), Chinese cities may need an additional 8.4 billion square meters. China's work-in-progress is over 2 billion square meters. There is enough land out there for another 2. The construction industry has production capacity of about 1.5 billion square meters per annum. Absolute oversupply, ie, there aren't enough people for all the buildings, could happen quite soon. When it happens, the consequences are quite severe. Property prices could drop like Japan has experienced in the past two decades, which would destroy the banking system.


The most serious damage that a property bubble inflicts is in changing demographics. High property prices bring down birth rates. When property prices decline after a bubble bursts, the low birth rate culture cannot be changed. Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan all went through property bubbles during their development. Their birth rates dropped during the bubbles and didn't recover afterwards despite government providing incentives. China's one-child policy alone will lead to a demographic catastrophe in two decades. The property bubble makes the trend irreversible: when the government abandons the one-child policy, there wouldn't be meaningful impact on birth rate. Within two decades Chinese population could be very old and declining. Of course, property prices would be very low and declining also.


In addition to net losses the redistribution aspect of a bubble has serious social consequences too. In the stock market bubble most households lose and a few win big. China's wealth inequality is already very high. The bubbles make it worse. A sizable or even the majority of China's population may not have meaningful wealth even after China's urbanization is complete. It will lead to an unstable society. A market economy is stable and efficient when the majority has meaningful wealth and, hence, has a stake in the system.

In summary, the market frenzy now won't last long. The correction may happen in the fourth quarter. There could be another wave of frenzy next year as China can still release more liquidity. When the dollar recovers, possibly in 2012, China's property and stock market could experience collapses like during the Asian Financial Crisis.