金價將會在2009年創下新高

不能承受之輕

謝國忠/文總第225期出版日期：2008-11-24

謝國忠搜狐博客http://xieguozhong.blog.sohu.com/

G20峰會未能達成一個全球協調性的財政刺激計劃；化解危機的最後一點希望破滅

被大肆炒作的G20華盛頓峰會結果令人失望。這場峰會，破滅了全球協作化解當前困擾全球的金融和經濟危機的最後希望。結果本身也說明了很多問題，讓我們更理解這些世界領導人如何行事，以及全球經濟管理的權力結構有多過時。

G20之“功”

首 先，我想說一下這次峰會好的方面。這場峰會聚集了那些最大、最富有的新興市場經濟體，也使世界認識到，無論未來全球經濟管理的結構如何，都應接納這些國 家。 G7在這場危機中顯得陳腐已無疑問，它們代表的是經濟合作與發展組織（OECD），也就是佔世界經濟總量70％的發達國家陣營。但在過去五年中，發達國家 對世界經濟增長的貢獻，不管是名義值還是真實值，都比不上發展中國家。同樣重要的是，新興市場經濟持有了大部分外匯儲備。如何處置這些錢，將是解決這場危 機的關鍵。這場峰會是G7衰落的開始，但是，用什麼取而代之，還是未知數。
要進行有效的決策，G20看來是太大了，應該縮減一半。 OECD一方，美國、英國、法國、德國和日本就可有效代表；發展中國家一方，“金磚四國”（中國、印度、巴西、俄羅斯），加上沙特阿拉伯，足矣。其中，沙 特阿拉伯可以代表歐佩克國家的利益，法國和德國可以代表歐元區。這樣，G10就不會太大，才能有效地決策。不過，任何全球性實體，決策再有效，要解決這場 危機也來不及了。

第二，峰會上各國作出了口頭承諾，要對貿易和投資保持國門開放。這就杜絕了上世紀30年代的《斯姆特－霍利關稅 法》（Smoot-Hawley Tariffs）的死灰復燃，避免了第二場大蕭條。有了70年前的經驗教訓，美國、歐洲、日本、中國等幾個大經濟體應該都不會重蹈覆轍。而且，跨國企業的 角色也讓自由貿易的政治算計發生了改變。 70年前，生產場所和公司所有權基本上屬於同一國，所以，不管是富國還是窮國，一開始都會因阻礙進口而獲益。當別國開始報復時，每個國家的境況最後都會變 糟。現在，大部分世界貿易都發生在新興市場和發達經濟體之間，通過發達經濟體的跨國公司進行。阻礙進口就直接損害了富國資本的利益。發達國家的資方和勞方 都不會同意實行保護主義，即便是不考慮他國的報復行為。

然而，這些口頭協議，並不能排除單邊貿易保護的可能性，且這些貿易保護大部分是針對中 國的。全世界的反傾銷中約有一半都針對中國。美國剛剛對產自中國的兒童產品施加了額外的安全要求，歐盟對中國產的蠟燭徵收60％的關稅，對非合金鋼絲產品 徵收50％的關稅。而這些，都發生在G20承諾自由貿易的同時。希望這些舉措只是個別現象，未來各國對待貿易的態度不會與G20《聲明》大相徑庭。

G20之未完成任務
雖然有這些積極的成績，但這場峰會很大程度上沒能滿足市場的期望。在穩定全球經濟這個關鍵問題上，它沒能達成一個協調性的財政刺激計劃，基本上還是讓每個國家各作各的選擇。

全 球化的時代，財政刺激的利益可能會由於貿易而外溢。對一個開放型小國經濟而言，財政刺激計劃根本不起作用。但是對於中國、美國這樣的大國，財政刺激的大多 數利益則可以留在國內。於是，各國單獨決定刺激計劃的規模時，它們都會選擇略小於最優規模的刺激計劃，因為刺激計劃的利益不會全部留在國內。在目前全球經 濟收縮情況下，一國財政刺激的外溢效應會非常大，所以，很少有國家去實行刺激計劃。只有全球經濟體的刺激計劃得以協調，才可能發揮功效。不幸的是，G20 沒有做到。

相反，貨幣刺激不太會產生外溢效應。減息可能使一國貨幣走弱，但同時也保護了本國貨幣刺激政策的收益。之所以大部分國家都依賴貨幣 刺激政策，主要是因為它們的財政赤字已經很大了，不想再惹上增發債券的政治抵制。貨幣刺激乍一看好像沒有什麼成本，但如我在前文中所說，減息不能刺激需 求，因為資產縮水損害了家庭或企業進行借貸的基礎，它的作用僅僅是通過降低持有成本，使銀行處理壞賬變得容易，並減輕了銀行出售不良資產的壓力，延長了調 整時間。貨幣刺激的負面作用可能不會立即顯現，但將來可能浮出水面。格林斯潘年代的那些泡沫正來自他對貨幣刺激的嗜好，後果就是今天慘遭蹂躪的全球經濟。

我相信，目前這股貨幣刺激政策的浪潮，會為未來幾年通貨膨脹培育土壤。資產縮水的通縮效應應該只是暫時的，其使需求曲線向下平移，並減輕了通脹壓 力。然而，隨著企業利潤降低、削減生產，需求疲弱導致的通縮效應就會不復存在。貨幣供給增加後，會暫時存在銀行里，但這些貨幣可能通過意想不到的渠道釋放 出來。大宗商品進入下一輪漲價週期，或是工會要求工資上漲時，貨幣供給增長的通脹效應就會釋放出來。

如果要“印鈔票”，一個更好也更為公平的 方式就是向所有居民等額發放現金。在泡沫時代，許多家庭和企業都藉貸過度。現在有三種方式解決問題：（1）用時間來逐漸化解，像日本；（2）企業破產，像 20世紀30年代的美國；（3）高通脹，像20世紀20年代的德國。美國還沒想清楚自己要走哪條路，但它肯定不會走日本那條路。我認為，在這樣一個負資產 （貸款額高於抵押品當前市值）的時代，美國人不會堅持償付房供，這不是美國人的文化。所以，美國要么讓大批家庭和企業破產，要么忍受高通脹。美聯儲現在要 避免大批破產，就只能不斷救援銀行和越來越多的非金融企業。因此，它正離高通脹越來越近。

20世紀20年代，德國企業在“一戰”後舉債過度，隨後就對德國央行施壓，迫使其採取通脹方法解決問題。混亂的過程最終導致了超級通貨膨脹。這種混亂的結 果為納粹最終掌權鋪就了道路。相反，當時的美國選擇了接受破產，這也將其推向了體制建設之路，這樣才有了今天龐大的美國經濟及其超級大國的地位。通脹之路 無法贏得歷史的青睞。

如果用通脹解決問題，政策需要透明和公平。央行應該公告它發行了多少貨幣並將貨幣均勻發給國民。貨幣增長會立即推高人們的通脹預期。商品、服務價格以及工資將快速上行，實際的債務負擔也會隨著通脹上升而減輕。如果央行貨幣政策是可信的，通脹在前期爆發後將會迅速回落。

但 是，我不指望央行採取這種合理的方法削減債務，政治規則不允許它發生。取而代之的是，全球央行將降低利率。當利率接近於零，央行就可以接受低質量的資產並 向銀行發放信貸，這正如當年日本央行的做法。貨幣增長的通脹效應暫時會被疲弱的需求和銀行放貸能力缺乏所掩蓋。一旦銀行放貸能力恢復，通脹將會再度惡化。 　

G20峰會最令人失望的是，法國和日本成為焦點。前者試圖成為“全球超級總管”，後者向IMF救濟了1000億美元。法國和日本都是有璀璨文化的偉大國 家，但是，它們僅代表過去而非未來，它們傾向於結果公平而非創造機會。未來，中國和美國有更多共同的利益。美國已無力獨自撐起全球經濟，如果它與中國聯手 則可以做到這點。遺憾的是，兩個國家都沒有這種想法。

美元泡沫難為繼

金融市場在未來三個月中將繼續劇烈震盪。當人從懸崖上跌落時，最 可怕的時刻莫過於墜落過程，他掙扎、尖叫，幻想落地時的痛苦。但真的落地之後，也許並沒有想像中的那麼可怕，也許僅僅是折了幾根肋骨或是腦震盪而已。金融 市場目前就處於墜落過程中，在2009年上半年，當全球經濟收縮放緩或停止後，市場才可能平靜下來。當然，平靜之後並不意味著牛市的開始，只有一輪新的增 長才能啟動新的牛市。

在近期的市場震盪中，美元和國債表現不錯，避險情緒的高漲支持二者走強，新興經濟體和商品期貨投機頭寸的減少也為美元提 供了支撐——作為結算貨幣，這種頭寸的減少增加了美元的需求。但是，這些支撐因素僅是技術性、暫時的，基本面並沒有徹底好轉。某些人認為，日元在20世紀 90年代日本經濟泡沫破滅之後依然表現良好，美元也會出現同樣的情況。但實際上，這種對比並不成立。

日本的泡沫是由本國資本支撐的。當泡沫破滅，國內需求減少，貿易盈餘增加。因為日本居民對外國資產需求不振，日元的需求增加，這支持了日元走強。

美 國的泡沫是由外國資本支撐的。當泡沫破滅，外國對美國資產需求下滑，同時，破裂的泡沫也抑制了美國國內的需求，從而減少對外國資本的需求。但美國在製定財 政刺激計劃速度上快於日本，這沖抵了由於資產縮水所引起的需求減少。美元目前的狀況要比15年前日元的狀況更加糟糕，外國資本的供給也許比需求下降更快。 因為其他經濟體實施財政刺激計劃，其盈餘資本將減少。美元在未來兩到三個月中可能會繼續升值，但當息差交易結束後，美元可能會急劇貶值。

國債 也許是另一個即將破滅的泡沫。雖然很多分析師都在談論通縮，但是在美國、英國和歐洲，通脹率仍然相當高，未來幾年可能出現的通脹情景無法合理解釋國債的高 價。另外，財政刺激計劃也會在明年大幅增加國債的發行量。從全球來看，這一數字可能會達到3萬億到4萬億美元。在經濟真正回穩之前，國債的供應很難減少。 這意味著，債券市場可能在2009年也步入一個大熊市，正如股票市場在2008年的情況。

我仍然看多黃金和能源。雖然全球經濟快速收縮，能源 價格也大幅走跌，長期來看，能源價格仍然前景良好。未來十年中，中國和印度的發展會大大增加能源需求。能源供應，特別是原油，將很難跟上需求的步伐。因為 所有大型石油公司主要產油區的產量都在下滑。只有當核能發展到足以替代生物燃料的時候，石油價格的神話才可能被打破，但這可能要20年時間甚至更久。

黃金作為貨幣的一種替代品，在全球央行都在擴張資產負債表之際，將表現良好。息差交易的平倉是一個負面因素，因為美元會伴隨息差交易的平倉而升值，而黃金則會伴隨美元升值而貶值。如果平倉結束，美元重新貶值，黃金將恢復看漲的趨勢。

我認為，金價將會在2009年創下新高，但是，黃金的神話也許會比原油破滅得更早。也許在2010年為了應對通脹風險，央行開始提升利率，黃金市場將會步入熊市。今後一段時期，黃金仍然會處於牛市。 ■

The hyped G-20 Summit in Washington disappointed. It removed the last hope for a coordinated global approach to handling the financial and economic crisis that is haunting the global economy. The result speaks volumes about the current crop of leaders around the world and the antiquated power structure that governs the global economy. The rapid contraction of the global economy will likely continue into the first quarter of 2009. The second quarter of 2009 may still see some contraction. The global economy may stabilize in the third quarter of 2009, but battered and directionless.

First, I have a few good things to say about the Summit. By bringing the largest and wealthiest emerging economies, the world is recognizing that any future structure for governing the global economy must include them. The G-7 has looked decidedly out of date during the Crisis. They are supposed to represent the OECD or developed block that still account for 70% of the global economy. But this group accounts for less growth than developing countries in the past five years in real and nominal terms. Equally important, emerging economies hold most of the foreign exchange reserves. How to deploy the money would be the key to solving this crisis. The Summit is the beginning of ditching G-7. What to replace it hasn't jelled.

G-20 looks too big to be effective in making decisions. It should be cut down by half. From the OECD side, the US, the UK, France, Germany, and Japan can represent the block effectively. From the developing economy block, the four BRIC countries plus Saudi Arabia can represent it effectively. Saudi Arabia can represent the interest of OPEC countries. France and Germany can represent the euro-zone. G-10 may be small enough for effective decision making. However, any effective global body for decision making would come too late for tackling the current crisis.

Second, the Summit gave verbal commitments to keeping national borders open to trade and investment. This is reassuring that the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of the 1930s would not resurface to cause another Great Depression. Knowing what happened seven decades ago, the big economies like the US, Europe, Japan, and China are unlikely to repeat the same mistakes. Further, the role of multinationals has changed the political calculation over free trade. Seventy years ago, the locations of production and ownership were mostly identical. Hence, both rich and poor benefited initially from blocking imports. As others retaliate, everyone eventually became worse off. Most trade in the world is between emerging and developed economies done by multinationals based in the developed economies. Blocking imports would immediately hurt capital in rich countries. Capital and labor wouldn't agree on protectionism in developed countries even not taking into consideration of retaliation by other countries.

The verbal commitments, however, don't rule out isolated protectionist measures that aim mostly at China. Roughly half of the anti-dumping measures in the world are aimed at China. The US just imposed additional safety requirements on children's products from China, and the EU 60% tariff on candles and 50% tariff on non-alloy steel wire products from China. These measures happened at the same time as the G-20 promised to maintain free trade. Hopefully, these measures don't signify a new direction contrary to the G-20 statement.

Despite the positive developments, the Summit largely failed to satisfy market expectations. On the crucial issue of stabilizing the global economy, it failed to agree on a coordinated program on fiscal stimulus. Essentially, each country is left to consider its best option. The benefit from fiscal stimulus in the era of globalization can leak out through trade. For a small open economy, fiscal stimulus doesn't work at all. For large economies like China and the US most of the benefits from fiscal stimulus can stay at home. When each economy decides on how much to stimulate, it will do less than optimal as the benefits don't all stay at home. When the global economy is contracting like now, the leakage from one's fiscal stimulus is very large. Hence, few economies are incentivized to stimulate. What works is for the global community to coordinate their stimulus. Unfortunately, the G-20 couldn't do it.

In contrast, monetary stimulus has a smaller tendency to leak out. Cutting interest rate tends to weaken one's currency, which protects the benefit from monetary stimulus at home. The main reason that most countries rely on monetary stimulus is that they are already running large fiscal deficits and don't want to encounter political resistance for more debt issuance. Monetary stimulus seems to incur no cost at first glance. As I have argued in this page before. Cutting interest rates doesn't stimulate demand, as asset deflation has destroyed the equity base for households or businesses to borrow. It merely makes it easier for banks to carry bad assets through lower carrying costs, lessening the pressure for selling bad assets and stretching the adjustment process. The negative effects of monetary stimulus may not be immediate but can surface in future. The bubbles under the Greenspan years originate from his penchant for monetary stimulus. The consequences are ravaging the global economy today.

The current wave of monetary stimulus lays the ground for inflation in the coming years, I believe. The deflationary effects from the asset deflation are temporary. They shift the demand curve downwards and decrease inflationary pressure. However, as businesses cut production in response to lower profitability, the demand weakness is no longer deflationary. The increased money supplies that are temporarily hoarded within banks could release through unexpected channels. Another wave of commodity inflation or wage increase through labor union demand could release the inflationary impact of the monetary growth.

A better and more equitable way to print money is to distribute cash among people evenly. Some households and businesses borrowed too much during the bubble. There are three ways out: (1) working it off overtime like in Japan, (2) bankruptcies like the US in 1930s, and (3) inflation like Germany in 1920s. The United States has not thought through which way it is going. It will not follow Japan's path. I don't think Americans will stick to their mortgages under a negative equity situation. It is not American culture. It would be either bankruptcy or inflation. The Fed is staving off bankruptcies by bailing out banks and increasingly non-financial businesses. So it is heading to an inflation solution.

In the 1920s German businesses took on too much debt during the First World War. They pushed its central bank towards an inflation solution, which Keynes erroneously blamed on the payments to the World War I victors. The chaotic process, probably on purpose to hide the central bank's true intentions, led to hyperinflation. The resulting chaos paved the way for the NAZI party to rise to power. In contrast, the US's willingness to accept bankruptcies pushed the country towards institution building, which laid the foundation for a gigantic US economy and its superpower status. History is not kind to the inflation approach.

For the inflation approach to work, it needs to be transparent and equitable. A central bank should announce how much money it prints and distributes it evenly among the population. The money growth shifts up inflation expectation immediately. All the prices of goods and services and wages will likely move up quickly to reflect the new reality. The real debt burden falls in line with the inflation. If the central bank is credible on its printing target, inflation will slow quickly after the initially spurt.

I wouldn't count on such a rational approach to debt write-off. Politics won't allow it. Instead, all the central banks in the world will cut interest rates and, as interest rates are close to zero, accept low quality assets for lending to banks, similar to what the Bank of Japan did. The inflationary impact of the monetary growth would be temporarily suppressed by weak demand and banks' inability to lend. When the banks can lend again, inflation will surge.

The leadership failure that is so apparent now all over the world has a generational twist to it. The baby boomers that were born after World War II pretty much run all the major economies in the world in governments and big companies. They have lived during extraordinary prosperity. The past recessions, even the stagflation during the 1970s, were quite mild by historical standards. In particular, the past two decades since the Berlin Wall fell were extraordinarily prosperous. The leaders that rose during this period were all very optimistic. Unfortunately, optimistic people are not the smartest people. Indeed, optimistic people are usually not very smart. But they rise to the top during prolonged prosperity that rewards optimism. When the catastrophe arrives, they are not equipped to handle it. As the crisis discredits them, a new generation of leaders, hopefully smarter, will rise to the top, and the right decisions are made. Hence, the solution to this crisis may require a leadership change. The US took the first step. Others may follow over the next 12-18 months. The political process suggests that the solution to the crisis will take time.

The saddest thing about the Summit was how France and Japan dominated the limelight. The former championed a global super regulator. The later doled out $100 billion for the IMF. France and Japan are great countries with wonderful cultures. But, they represent the past, not the future. Their tendencies are to enforce equal outcome rather than opportunity. China and the US are much more in tone with the future. The United States is not strong enough to run the world on its own. An alliance between China and the US could. Unfortunately, neither country is embracing the idea.

What will happen and what should happen are usually quite different. I have mentioned three elements on what would likely unfold on policy front: (1) cutting interest rates too much and degrading central bank balance sheets, (2) stimulating fiscally too little, and (3) political changes over next 12-18 months. On the economic front, the rapid contraction of the global economy will continue into the first quarter of 2009. The second quarter of 2009 will probably see much slower contraction. Stability may return by the third quarter of 2009. While economic stability may return in the foreseeable future, meaningful growth is not visible yet. The growth driver for the global economy-the US's consumption and China's factory building is unhinged and can't be put together. The world will struggle to find a new growth engine.

Financial markets will continue to fluctuate wildly over the next three months. When one falls off a cliff, it is most frightening during the fall. One kicks, screams, and fantasizes the pain when hitting the ground. When one hits the ground, it may not be as bad as imagined. It could be a few broken ribs or a concussion. Financial markets are now in the falling mode. In the first half of 2009, when the global contraction slows or stops, the markets will probably calm down. Bottoming, however, is different from the beginning of a bull market. Only a new growth cycle can start a new bull market.

The dollar and government bonds have performed well during the recent turmoil. The flight to safe havens has supported both. The unwinding of speculative positions in the emerging economies and commodities has further supported the dollar. The dollar has been a funding currency for such positions. The unwinding increases demand for the dollar. However, the factors that support both asset classes are technical and temporary. Fundamentals are not good for either. Some argue that Japanese yen performed very well after its bubble burst in early 1990s and the dollar could follow the same path. The comparison doesn't work. Japan's bubble was funded by local capital. When it burst, domestic demand decreased and trade surplus bloomed. Without significant domestic demand for foreign assets, demand for yen increased with asset deflation. Yen only came down when foreigners borrowed yen to speculate in other assets.

The US's bubble was funded by foreign capital. As the bubble bursts, foreign demand for the US assets will decline. The bursting bubble decreases the US domestic demand and, hence, the need for foreign capital. But, the US is ramping up fiscal stimulus much quicker than Japan, which offsets the demand reduction from asset deflation. The position for the dollar now is considerably worse than for yen fifteen years ago. The supply of foreign capital will probably decline quicker than its need for it. As other economies engage in fiscal stimulus, their surplus capital will drop. The dollar may continue to appreciate in the next two to three months. It may weaken sharply afterwards when the carry trades are all unwound.

Government bonds may be another bubble that will burst soon. Even though many analysts are talking about deflation, inflation readings in the US, the UK, and Europe are still quite high. Inflation is a lagging variable and could drop further from here. Still, the high prices for government bonds cannot be justified on the likely inflation scenario in the next few years. Further, fiscal stimulus will increase the supplies of government bonds dramatically in the coming year. Globally, the increase could be over $3-4 trillion. Until growth comes back, the increased supply may remain. Bonds could slip into a big bear market in 2009 like stocks in 2008.

I remain positive on gold and energy. While the global economy is contracting rapidly, energy prices are undershooting. The longer term story for energy remains positive. China and India's development will greatly increase energy demand for the next decade. The supplies, especially oil, won't be able to keep up. All the big oil companies report that their major production fields are declining in yield. The positive story for energy will change when nuclear power has grown sufficiently to replace fossil fuel. That will probably take two decades or longer.

Gold is a substitute for currency. As central banks around the world expand their balance sheets rapidly, gold should do well. The unwinding of carry trades is negative for it. As dollar appreciates with the unwinding of carry trades, gold has declined in line with dollar's rise. When the unwinding is done and dollar begins depreciate, gold should resume its bullish trend. I think gold could make new highs in 2009. The bull story for gold will end quicker than for energy. When central banks begin to raise interest rates, possibly in 2010 in response to rising inflation, gold may slip into a bear market. For now, gold still looks bullish.